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Daddy 
The day is full of birds 
Sounds like they’re saying words 
 
Kate Bush – Prelude (Aerial, A Sky of Honey) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this thesis to my late father and my mother. They have given me the time, tools and 
freedom to make my own composition in life. For that I thank them. 
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Prelude 
 
Introduction 
As many authors have shown over the last few decades, when it comes to questions of ecology, 
nature and sustainable development, (democratic) decision making has proven to be difficult on both 
the national and international level. Short term interests of politicians, economic interests, historical 
sensitivities, the scale and relative invisibility of environmental problems and the lack of sense of 
urgency are often named as the reasons which prevent national and international politicians and 
leaders from adopting more sustainable or environmental friendly policies. (Bourg & Whiteside, 
2010; Jager, 2007; Jones & Jacobs, 2007; Korthals, 1994) One only has to look at the recent United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in June 2012, also known as Rio+20, which 
did not result in anything more than vague intentions. 
However, there is another side to this problematic process of decision making, namely the debate on 
what is in fact sustainable or good for the environment. This debate is full of arguments based on 
scientific evidence but also on a sense of morality. Thus, facts and values come into play. Bruno 
Latour approaches the issue from this angle. This French thinker stresses that there is a division that 
has had profound consequences for the way people view politics and nature and their relation. He 
tries to show that the modernist distinction between Science (Latour’s capital S) and politics, or 
Nature (facts) and Society (values) are false dichotomies.  The idea of indisputability of scientific facts 
and the concept of one single nature have long been paralyzing politics, as there was a house of 
nature that was separated from the house of society.  However, in recent times it has become clear 
that this modern view is not valid. Yet, the lack of a new and more valid view is another reason why 
politics do not seem to be successful. For example, in An Attempt at writing a “Compositionist 
Manifesto” (2010) Latour refers to the Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009 (as part of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). He is not surprised by its lack of 
results: ‘Needless to say, the Copenhagen event was, in that respect, a total (and largely predictable) 
failure. Not because there is as yet no World Government able to enforce decisions —in the unlikely 
case any would have been made—, but because we have as yet no idea of what it means to govern 
the world now that Nature as an organizing concept (or, rather, conceit) is gone.’ (Latour, 2010: p. 8-
9). Given the similar weak outcome, it is not unlikely that Latour has similar feelings about the Rio+20 
conference. 
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Bruno Latour 
Bruno Latour (born in 1947) is a contemporary French social theorist. He was taught as a philosopher 
and anthropologist. In his earlier life he was heavily influenced by Michel Serres (Restivo, 2010: p. 2).  
After cultural anthropological studies in Africa, he conducted an ethnographic study into laboratory 
work. This resulted in his 1979 book Laboratory Life. The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, co-
written by Steve Woolgar. Despite the title of this book, Latour later claimed that he is not a social 
constructivist (Restivo, 2010: p. 24, 27). Looking at the titles of three works on Bruno Latour, it seems 
that Latour has many different faces. Sal Restivo (2010) labelled him as “The Once and Future 
Philosopher”, while Bruce Kennedy (2010) characterizes Latour as political epistemologist and 
Graham Harman (2009) names him “Prince of Networks”. Thus, it remains challenging to precisely 
position Latour. He seems to be too metaphysical to be a scientist, but also too empirical to be a 
philosopher. When Harman called him an empirical metaphysician, Latour rejected this label stating 
that his main focus is on empirical research (2009: p. 25). Nevertheless, Restivo compares Latour to 
Thomas Kuhn, claiming their most prominent works are philosophical, rather than scientific, and calls 
Latour’s approach to “the social” ethnomethodological1, not sociological (2010: p. 1). Moreover, 
Latour has criticized sociology for its scientific claims and reductionism (Restivo, 2010: p. 3, 7, 8). 
Harman argues that Latour is hardly known among metaphysicists, despite his concern with 
metaphysical questions (2009: p. 5). Rather, Latour is most famous for his actor-network theory 
(ANT) (Restivo, 2010: p. 3). Latour is considered to be a creative mind and his writings are witty, 
inventive and complicated (Harman, 2009; Restivo, 2010). And, as Kennedy argues, ‘Politics has […] 
never been far from Latour’s thoughts’ and ‘For Latour […] knowledge and the political go hand in 
hand’ (2010, p. 83-84). With so many sides to Latour’s work, it is not surprising that a recent book by 
Anders Blok and Torben Elgaard Jensen (2011) is titled Bruno Latour. Hybrid thoughts in a hybrid 
world. 
 
Definition of the problem 
In his work, Latour does not merely diagnose the problem of paralyzed politics, he tries to offer a 
remedy. In several books and articles, but notably in Politics of Nature (2004) he lays the groundwork 
for his Attempt at writing a “Compositionist Manifesto”. In these works he proposes an alternative 
way of practicing decision making, that takes into account the insight that the modernist 
bicameralism can no longer be upheld, or in fact has never even existed in reality. In this new form of 
                                                          
1
 This makes him of particular interest to a Humanistic Studies scholar, as ethnomethodology deals with 
people’s sense-making activities. 
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political ecology called compositionism, politicians and scientists are no longer separated by a false 
divide. If indeed we have no idea of how to govern the world without ‘Nature as an organizing 
concept’, compositionism seems to offer some clues for a new form of governance. This governance 
is still based on two distinct Houses (Latour, 2004: p. 115). However, these Houses are not those of 
nature and society, but those of taking into account and arranging in rank order. Furthermore, Latour 
brings non-humans in the democratic process, arguing they are stakeholders as well and they can get 
a voice through the sciences. Although this concept of compositionism is innovative and intriguing, it 
is challenging to envision this new fashion of political process in a practical way, due to Latour’s style 
and the complexity of his argument. In addition, Latour did not work out a fully developed view on 
the practical applications of this concept, his work is mainly theoretical. However, during the Gifford 
Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in February 2013, he admitted that it is important to research 
the implications of his work on political practice in the context of the United Nations (Latour, 2013f). 
And in 2012 Latour started a practical experiment of compositionism with the project An Inquiry Into 
Modes of Existence. Yet, even after a careful study of his argument, it is difficult to get a sense of how 
compositionism can be applied.  
My hypothesis is that compositionism can best be practiced, at least in theory, in an international 
arena where – to use Latour’s terms – politicians, scientists, moralists, economists, diplomats and 
administrators from all over the world come together. The one event that came closest to such a 
compositionist arena is in my view the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD) in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. Needless to say, this conference was based on other principles (a 
different constitution), but it did showcase an unprecedented gathering of people, both in size and 
composition and shared a similar goal with Latour: sustainable development. Therefore I will explore 
in this thesis the conditions under which a conference like Rio+20 could be organized based on the 
principles of compositionism. This leads to my main research question: 
Under what conditions could Bruno  Latour’s political ecology provide an alternative basis for the 
organization of a United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD)? 
It should be obvious that I will not explore every last detail of organizing an international conference, 
for example by addressing  logistics, finances, etcetera. Instead I will focus on the circumstances and 
global changes that would be needed to even begin to organize a “compositionist conference”. Even 
though I am seeking to put the complex concept into more practical and applicable terms, the 
answers will likely remain somewhat abstract. Hopefully, this will allow others to turn it into actual 
practice. In order to answer the main research question, I will first discuss the different aspects of 
Latour’s political ecology. In the Prologue I will introduce the concept by summarizing An attempt at 
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writing a “Compositionist Manifesto”.2 This way, the reader can become acquainted with the three 
facets of Latour’s work that will be discussed more extensively in the following section (Fugues): the 
problems of modernism (Fugue I); why we need to ecologize instead of modernize (Intermezzo); and 
what his political ecology entails (Fugue II). In the following section (Étude) I will present a brief 
discussion on the possibility of an applied compositionism in which I will address some general 
difficulties and present two scenarios for application of compositionism in the context of the UNCSD. 
In the closing section of this thesis (Finale) I will present my conclusions. 
 
Research objectives 
In my view it is extremely important to describe abstract philosophical and theoretical ideas in 
various appealing ways. Thus, the first objective of this research is to offer a fresh interpretation of 
Bruno Latour’s complex theoretical work on compositionism and to connect it to an existing practice. 
This will hopefully make his work more accessible and interesting to a wider range of professionals, 
especially in the fields of politics, activism, governance and diplomacy. At best, it would provide new 
ideas on how to organize successful (UN) conferences on sustainable development.  
The second objective is to provide new input for the discussion on how to enhance both democracy 
and sustainable development. As stated in the introduction, there is a problematic relation between 
these two big and diffuse concepts. Combining Latour’s innovative theory with actual practices will 
offer new insights into the complex ways democracy and sustainable development are connected. 
The third objective is less explicit. In much of his work Latour offers a critique on humanist thinking, 
without bringing it down. He brings non-humans into the democratic process, and one could state 
that this is a way of non-humanizing democracy. However, it will become clear that this will not 
necessarily undermine the humanization project of humanist and humanistic scholars.  
 
Research methods 
This thesis is mainly a literature study and partly a philosophic exercise. It is important to emphasize 
that what is presented here is my interpretation of compositionism. Although Latour has written 
repeatedly about this political ecology, the concept remains difficult to grasp. In An attempt at 
writing a “Compositionist Manifesto” Latour sets out a framework for a political document that could 
                                                          
2
 Instead of using standard expressions like chapter and introduction, I have chosen terms from musical 
compositions. 
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present compositionism in more details. However, at this time Bruno Latour has not written such a 
manifesto, although Politics of Nature. How to bring the sciences into democracy (2004) is perhaps 
the piece that comes closest to it. That book is Latour’s first major attempt to explore a way to 
involve the sciences in democratic decision making in a more legitimate manner. He proposes an 
alternative constitution in opposition to the “modern Constitution” in which science and society are 
in separated houses. He formulates the skills that are necessary to be able to successfully implement 
this new kind of democracy. These skills form the basis for compositionism in practice.  
In addition to studying An attempt at writing a “Compositionist Manifesto” and Politics of Nature and 
a selection of other written texts, I have attended Latour’s Gifford Lecture series in February 2013, 
titled Facing Gaia. A New Enquiry into Natural Religion. In these lectures at the University of 
Edinburgh, Latour explains why the term “natural religion” is a pleonasm, and how we can join to 
face the planetary problems together. I have gratefully used my notes and the video recordings of 
the University of Edinburgh for this thesis. It has also been helpful to use other audiovisual sources, 
like recorded lectures and speeches on YouTube and iTunes. At times, the questions posed by the 
audiences have forced Latour to explain himself in another way, often leading to a better 
understanding of his writings. More than once, I have had to look up references from literature, art 
and philosophy to comprehend Latour’s argument. His writings and lectures are truly rich in that 
sense. However, I have tried to leave these references out of this work as much as possible, in order 
to avoid long explanations and enhance readability.   
I have attempted to paint a concise yet complete picture of compositionism. It would be an 
understatement to say that my effort is in no way like an actual “Compositionist Manifesto” that 
Latour would be able to write. I have merely endeavoured to turn a part of Latour’s oeuvre on 
political ecology into a more accessible piece of work. Admittedly, it is as if a composer of pop songs 
has attempted to recompose a collection of fugal works by Johann Sebastian Bach. It is up to the 
reader to decide what kind of composition they prefer. 
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1. Prologue: an introduction to Compositionism 
 
1.1. Introduction 
It requires a strong introduction to present a concept that has been developed in a wide range of 
writings and presentations, for a wide range of audiences and in a time frame exceeding a decade. 
Therefore I will take an article that can function as a point of entry into the world of compositionism, 
namely An attempt at writing a “Compositionist Manifesto” (2010). Certainly, it is not the first paper 
written by Latour on the subject, but it is a concise accumulation of previous writings. It is in my view 
more or less an abstract of the work on compositionism. It describes three essential characteristics of 
Latour’s project. First of all, it defines the problem to which compositionism is the answer. This is 
essential in understanding the concept. Secondly, it argues why other solutions to the problem are 
inefficient. Lastly, it introduces the alternative answer to the problem, compositionism. In addition to 
being concise, it is Latour’s most straightforward endeavour to present compositionism as an 
alternative view on how to progress in the world. Hence it is an appropriate gateway to Latour’s body 
of work on the subject.  
In contrast to what I will do in the following chapters, I will present the paper in the chronological 
order in which it was written. The titles in italics are Latour’s own. In addition, I will emphasize which 
aspects of the concept presented here will need a more in depth discussion to reach a better 
understanding of compositionism. These aspects will be presented in the following chapters of this 
thesis.  
It is important to note that it is merely an attempt at a manifesto, and not a final version of a 
manifesto. It was originally written as a speech for the University of Munich in 2010 and which was, 
after a few more presentations, published as a paper on Latour’s website.  That version is used here. 
 
 
1.2. An attempt at writing a “Compositionist Manifesto” by Bruno Latour 
 
A prologue in the form of avatar  
In a short prologue, Latour refers to the arts to define the problem he wishes to address. If you have 
any knowledge of the creative works to which he refers, you get a sense of where he is going. First, 
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he speaks of Avatar by director James Cameron. There are several reasons to be interested in this 
motion picture and to start this manifesto with it. Latour argues that Avatar is the first major movie 
in which Gaia, in the movie called Pandora, is not completely destroyed but defeats modernist 
humans in their effort to take over and exploit its resources.3 The lesson that we learn from this 
movie, according to Latour, is ‘that modernized and modernizing humans are not physically, 
psychologically, scientifically and emotionally equipped to survive on their Planet’ (2010: p. 2). 
Second, he draws a comparison with Michel Tournier’s novel on Robinson Crusoe, who individually 
has to rediscover what it means to live in his new environment. However, in Avatar it is not an 
individual effort but a collective experience. Hence, through this prologue we become aware of one 
part of the problem that Latour wishes to tackle: humankind does not know how to live and survive 
on Earth, and it has to relearn this collectively. 
 
Why writing a manifesto? 
In the following paragraph, Latour explores the question whether a manifesto is an appropriate form 
to present his ideas in. He admits that writing manifestos is an outdated exercise, because 
traditionally they have been used  to point to the direction in which progress would inevitably lead. 
However, in Latour’s view, ‘the time of time has passed’ (2010: p. 2). This means the end of the era of 
thinking of progress as development in an irreversible and inevitable direction, preceded by a group 
of advanced thinkers who lead the way. The moderns have now discovered that the notion of 
progress proves to be false. A clear indicator of this discovery is the indecisiveness at the United 
Nation Climate Change Conference (UNCCC) in Copenhagen in 2009. The representatives remained  
divided on whether a radical change was needed to address the threat  of climate change or if 
business as usual, moving forward as always, was enough. And yet, writing a manifesto might still be 
a good idea if it is to give a new meaning to the notion of progress. Or, in Latour’s own words, if it 
makes explicit: 
[…] a subtle but radical transformation in the definition of what it means to progress, that is, to 
process forward and meet new prospects. Not as a war cry for an avant-garde to go even further 
and faster ahead, but rather as a warning, a call to attention, so as to stop going further in the 
same way as before toward the future. The nuance I want to outline is rather that between 
progress and progressive. It is as if we had to move from an idea of inevitable progress to one of 
progressive, tentative and precautionary progression. It is still a movement. It is still going 
forward. But […] the tenor is entirely different. 
(2010: p.3)  
                                                          
3
 Gaia refers to the notion of our planet as introduced by James Lovelock in the 1970s. 
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Next, Latour clarifies why his would be a “Compositionist Manifesto”. First, every manifesto has a 
word ending with –ism in it. Composition comes from the Latin word componere, to put together.  
Latour appreciates this word because it accentuates that when things are put together, they 
maintain their heterogeneity. Furthermore, it is related to composure, compromise and compost, 
which all point at what compositionism is about: precautious, diplomatic and in a way ecological. 
Then there is the obvious connection to art, another important relation for Latour. Moreover, it is 
important to point out that a composition can fail or succeed. It can be well or badly composed. This 
is a clear distinction from constructivism and the question whether something is constructed or not. 
Luckily, what is composed can also be decomposed. An important characteristic is that 
compositionism has a ‘task of searching for universality but without  believing that this universality is 
already there’ (2010: p. 4). It is neither universalist nor relativistic. Latour: 
From universalism it takes up the task of building a common world; from relativism, the certainty 
that this common world has to be built from utterly heterogeneous parts that will never make a 
whole, but at best a fragile, revisable and diverse composite material. 
(2010: p.4) 
In the following paragraphs, Latour aims to expand on three connotations of compositionism. 
 
An alternative to critique? 
The first function of compositionism is that could be an alternative to critique. Latour refers to 
critique in the Kantian sense, which he describes as ‘a wholesale acceptation of the divide between 
human and non-human’ (2010: p. 4, 17). This is an interesting yet vague definition of critique, but 
Latour explains what he means, by defining the divide in another way. Critique created the (false) 
modernist division between a world of appearances and a world of realities, between what was mere 
delusion and what was real.  This led to a huge breach between ‘what was felt and what was real’ 
(2010: p. 4). This real world was thought to be transcendent, a world of beyond, and secular. In this 
sense, critique has had an enormous impact on the theory of science. However, in compositionism 
there is no such division nor such a transcendent world. Compositionism is about immanence.  For 
Latour this is an important difference, ‘because what can be critiqued cannot be composed’ (2010: p. 
5). Differently put, it is a matter of the right equipment, and it is not possible to compose with the 
tools of critique. He compares critique to a hammer which can shatter the wall of appearances, but 
may not necessarily discover a world of reality behind it. ‘What is the use of poking holes in 
delusions, if nothing truer is revealed beneath?’ (2010: p. 5), Latour wonders. Both moderns and 
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postmoderns have used these tools of critique for iconoclasm, the destruction of (religious) images 
and symbols (or that wall of delusive appearances). Latour makes a plea for “iconoclash” instead, 
which focuses on the topic, instead of the resource. In other words: in the so-called modern era, 
Science has tried to debunk religious and mythical explanations, metaphors, symbols, and narratives, 
by offering another truth, but no complete explanation of the world. 
Then, Latour moves on to the topic of nature. By this he means not the world of flora and fauna, but 
that which the natural sciences have sought to unravel. The domain of reality which is supposedly 
hidden behind the mist of myth and delusion. He states that it is now odd to see this as a separate 
domain, as critique has done for so long. He declares the end of nature but he objects to the new 
term postnaturalism, since nature has never been a thing or a separate domain. It is strange to speak 
of a postnatural (or postmodern) world if there has never been a natural (or modern) world.  
Compositionism would rather speak of pre- or multi-naturalism.  
The division (or in Alfred North Whitehead’s language: Bifurcation) between the house of nature and 
the house of society is a political construct , which Latour calls the Modernist Constitution (2010: p. 
6). It is political because power was distributed by determining ‘what could and what could not be 
discussed’ (2010: p. 6). Moreover, it determined who was allowed to speak, and who and what had 
to remain silent. This meant that only science could speak of matters of fact, which were part of an 
outside reality and stripped of any meaning (Latour separates Science (capital S) from sciences and 
scientists, more on that in the next paragraph). Progress was viewed as the process of establishing 
facts, slowly replacing subjectivity and thus creating a rational world in which reasonable people 
could easily make decisions, based on facts. This, of course, proved to be false. 
 
A successor to Nature? 
Latour reiterates the conclusion that he already exposed two decades ago in his book We have never 
been Modern, namely that the idea of nature is a utopia. It has never corresponded with the practice 
of science, technology, commerce or industry. Therefore Latour proposes compositionism as a 
successor to nature. That this might come a bit too soon or as a bit of a shock to some, becomes 
clear from his reflection on “climategate”. In 2009, before the UNCCC took place, a scandal arose, 
after it was “discovered” through stolen emails of climate scientists, that scientific evidence of 
human induced climate change had been constructed. Latour mocks the people who “suddenly” 
realized that it was humans who constructed scientific facts, by using instruments and data sets, paid 
for by grants and written down in texts. It was still not clear that the discussion should not be about 
whether the facts were constructed or not, but what was well or badly constructed. Much to the 
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embarrassment of Latour, even the scientists who were involved in the affair did not seem to 
understand this distinction. They held on to the idealistic, theoretical vision of Science as a gateway 
that gives access to unmediated facts that are undisputable, instead of recognizing that in practice 
the sciences and scientists actually do discuss what is true or false. Latour argues that “climategate” 
would have been an ‘ideal moment to connect the disputability of politics with the disputability of 
the sciences (small s)’ (2010: p. 7). However, this did not happen and the human dimension of 
scientific practice was presented as a scandalous thing. And here Latour states the shortest and 
clearest definition of compositionism so far: 
We compositionists, want immanence and truth together. Or, to use my language: we want 
matters of concern not only matters of fact. For a compositionist, nothing is beyond dispute. And 
yet, closure has to be achieved. But by the slow process of composition and compromise, not by 
the revelation of the world of beyond. 
(2010: p. 8) 
This is not to say that we need to combine science and politics in the way French philosopher Michel 
Serres proposed in Le Contrat Naturel (1992). Latour is influenced by Serres, and he too believes that 
science is good at representing facts and politics at representing humans. Nevertheless, he opposes 
Serres’ idea of a government of scientists, claiming that it would merely be a combination of the 
worst of both science and politics. Many environmentalists also fall in this trap. For Latour the end of 
the divide between science (or nature) and politics (society) means that we have to discover anew 
how to view and govern the world. 
 
Back to the 16th century? 
Now that the idea of nature has been decomposed, Latour finds that we are closer to the 16th 
century. This was the time before the invention of the Bifurcation (or divide), the time before the 
“epistemological break”, a term he borrows from another French philosopher, Louis Althusser. 
During that time, ideas of connections between the micro- and macrocosm were common. But they 
came under pressure as they were ridiculed by rationalists in the time of nature (“modernity”). But 
with the end of nature it becomes obvious that micro- and macrocosm are literally, not only 
figuratively connected. This creates what Latour calls a kakosmos, a messy and complex world. This 
world no longer looks like the old one that was supposedly made up of ‘primary qualities (real, 
speechless, speaking by themselves, but alas, devoid of any meaning and any value)’ and ‘secondary 
qualities (subjective, meaningful, able to talk, full of values, but, alas, empty of any reality)’ (2010: p. 
10). Yet this world was never actually experienced in practice, but only radically thought. So a 
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successor to nature does not change the way the world is, but how we think of the world and how 
we approach it in our research and governance. Part of this consists of a rethinking of the questions 
of animism, inanimism and agency. For Latour it is clear that not only humans but also non-humans 
(things and animals) have agency, are animated. So to him it is bizarre that so-called “rational 
people” make fun of those who believe in animism. This view of agency means that non-humans are 
not just consequences in long continual lines of causes and consequences, but that they add 
something to the cause as well. For compositionists, this linear continuity is not given. This is part of 
the complexity that we now face, but it does not mean that reductionism has lost its value. According 
to Latour it is still important to use reductionism as a handle to gain interesting and helpful data. But 
it is exactly that, a handle to get a grasp of reality. Thus, there is a difference between reductionism 
as a tool and reductionism as a worldview. Because it is not given to them, compositionists have to 
compose continuity. Not just because microcosm and macrocosm are once again interrelated, but 
because ‘consequences overwhelm their causes’ (2010: p. 13), or in other words: the predictability of 
nature is no longer there (although it never was). With this, facts are no longer safe. They have 
become issues. Disputes and controversies about matters of fact within the sciences are no problem 
for compositionists. On the contrary, they have always been there, they are political and should now 
be put in the spotlight. According to Latour it is ‘the best path to finally taking seriously the political 
task of establishing the continuity of all entities that make up the common world’ (2010: p. 14). 
 
No future but many prospects? 
After problematizing nature and dismissing critique, Latour now turns to the compositionist view of 
what it means to progress. He argues that modernists have always had their back to the future. It 
was as if they were trying to escape their past, without looking at where they were heading. Only a 
few years ago, faced with the ecological crisis, they started contemplating their future. Latour 
therefore distinguishes future (the French le future) from prospect (in French l’avenir). Future is then 
the modern and utopian fleeing backwards from the past. Prospect is rather like an outlook, 
something which we can anticipate, a scenario that we see coming towards us. And instead of one 
certain future, there are many prospects. But what lies ahead is not a well composed cosmos, but 
rather a kakosmos. And thus we have to compose ‘in all the meanings of the word, including to 
compose with, that is to compromise, to care, to move slowly, with caution and precaution’ (2010: p. 
15).  
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What the two manifestos have in common? 
In the concluding paragraph of the article, Latour explains what a potential “Compositionist 
Manifesto”  would have in common with Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx’ Communist Manifesto. That 
would be the quest for the Common. The difference is that for compositionists the common world 
has to be composed, while in communism it is taken for granted and imposed. Finally, referring back 
to the prologue, Latour poses the question that is to be raised in his manifesto: ‘How will we find a 
sustainable home on Gaia?’ (2010: p. 16). 
 
1.3. Conclusion 
If the reader is left baffled and full of questions, (s)he should not be worried. This prologue was 
merely an introduction to Latour’s work and it is obvious that many things deserve an elaboration. In 
the following section I will discuss different aspects that have been highlighted here. In Fugue I: A 
divided globe I will set out Latour’s interpretation of modernity and his critique on it. I will go deeper 
into the divide between nature and society, and the notions of progress, mononaturalism, animism. 
iconoclasm, matters of fact and matters of concern. In the Intermezzo I will explain why Latour 
argues that we need to ecologize the world instead of modernizing it. The main problems of 
modernization will be addressed as well as the difficulties that come with the end of modernism. In 
the final part of the following section, Fugue II: Compositionism I will go deeper into Latour’s answer 
to the problems he formulates, such as a new constitution and different concepts of progress and 
governance. I will not come back to the question of manifestos or the connection to communism, as 
both are hardly relevant matters in the discussion of compositionism.   
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2. Fugue I: A divided globe 
 
2.1. Introduction 
When she was younger, my sister had one of those globes. A miniature Earth on a standard, with the 
names of the countries (as they were then known) on it, and a light bulb inside it. The globe was 
made out of two halves and the seam where they were joined was right at the equator. To me this is 
a nice symbol of the problems that Latour wishes to address: the divide between nature and society 
and premature unification. This last point is only indirectly addressed in An attempt at writing a 
“Compositionist Manifesto” but is explained more elaborately in other work. 
As we have already seen in the prologue, or the introduction into compositionism, Latour 
problematizes notions of modernity, nature, politics and progress. In this part of my thesis, I will 
present a more extensive discussion of these problems. First, I will discuss Latour’s view on 
modernism and the bifurcation that created it (paragraph 2.2.). Next, I will go deeper into the idea of 
the houses of nature (2.3.) and society (2.4). Lastly, I will come back to the question of modernity and 
why it should be replaced with another organizing principle (2.5). By the end of this chapter I hope to 
have convinced you of the view of my sister’s globe as a good symbol of Latour’s problematization. I 
will start the discussion of every aspect of the problem with a quote from An attempt at writing a 
“Compositionist Manifesto”, which I will then clarify. In order to understand his work, it is essential to 
explore more in detail what Latour means by commonly used terms like nature and modernity. 
Latour often uses well-known terms in a slightly or even radically different way. For example, take a 
look at the glossary in Politics of Nature, in which such words as thing, diplomacy, civilization and 
politics are defined. 
 
2.2. The Modern Globe in theory 
First, let me start with this image of the globe as a whole, which we can call the Modern Globe. As we 
have seen in the introduction of compositionism, Latour argues that modernized and modernizing 
people are not able to survive on their planet. This is narrated in the fictional movie Avatar, but for 
Latour it is very much true in reality as well. Since the seventeenth century the notion of modernity 
has become the model for the organization of the Western world. There are many ways to describe 
the essence of this modern world (Blok & Jensen, 2011: p. 52). In Latour’s interpretation, which he 
put forward in 1993 in his book We have never been modern, the era of modernity started in the 
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seventeenth century with the conflicting work of Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle (Blok & Jensen, 
2011: p. 56-59). In this conflict lies the foundation of a radically new way of thinking and organizing 
the world that was to become dominant. This new way is what Latour calls the Modern Constitution. 
Previously, the world was perceived and explained in a very different way, predominantly through 
observation by philosophy, superstition and religion. However, in the time of Hobbes and Boyle, the 
emergence of empirical study methods had led to other ways of observing and exploring reality: 
experimentation. It was now possible to reason and to produce evidence. Or, to put it differently, 
instead of merely trying to explain the world and how it works, it was now to some extent possible to 
actually know how the world works. This process of getting to know the world is what we later 
named (natural) science. What could not be explained in this natural way, was supernatural or 
superstition. While that was once the only way of coming up with explanations for all phenomena, 
now there was another. However, instead of incorporating these different methods to explain and 
organizing the world, a division was created. Human destiny and nonhuman destiny, or the 
microcosm and macrocosm were separated. In theory, at least, as Latour argues that Hobbes’ views 
on political representation were not as separated from scientific representation as he might have 
thought. Likewise, Boyle’s view on scientific representation was more political than he might have 
believed. (Blok & Jensen, 2011: p. 56-59) Thus, although the modern world was practically still the 
same, still one globe, it was now perceived as “broken” into two parts. In the analogy with my sister’s 
globe I will call them hemispheres. 
This bifurcated globe consists of a hemisphere of subjectivity, values, appearances in one half, 
separated from a hemisphere of cold, objective facts. The latter is the field of nature, of natural 
sciences and scientists.  The subjective world, however, is the world of politics (or society), where 
moralists, politicians and the religious speak of values, meaning and culture. Thus, under the Modern 
Constitution there is the domain of scientific representation of nature (as thought by Boyle) and the 
domain of political representation of humans (in accordance with Hobbes). In addition, the moderns 
view scientific matters of fact as indisputable. They are eternally true, everywhere and for 
everybody. They indicate that there is one common world where the laws of nature apply at all 
times. In other words, there is one nature for all. In contrast, there are many ways in which humans 
can be represented in the political domain. Moral rules do not apply to everyone, or are at least 
debated and disputable. There are many cultures. Thus, according to Latour, under the Modern 
Constitution there is mononaturalism and multiculturalism. And throughout the centuries of the 
modern era, the people from the West travelled all over the world, only to find that non-Western 
cultures were still living in “pre-modern conditions”. For them the microcosm and macrocosm were 
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still connected, and supernatural and superstitious beliefs persistent. In many parts of the world 
however, modern thinking was introduced in various degrees. 
In the following paragraphs I will go deeper into the two hemispheres of the Globe of Modernity. 
Latour uses his own metaphors for both hemispheres, for example he speaks of two houses, that of 
nature and of society (Latour, 2004: p. 14). However, these are closely related to the concepts of 
science and politics, objectivity and subjectivity, non-humans and humans. He also uses the term 
collective to replace society (Latour, 2004: p. 7; 2013a). For reasons of consistency I will speak of the 
house of nature and the house of society, although I might still use the terms hemisphere when I 
refer to my metaphor of the globe. See figure 1 for a general description of the houses, based on 
different sources (Blok & Jensen, 2011; Latour, 2004; 2010; 2013a; 2013b). 
 
Figure 1 
 
2.3. First hemisphere of the Modern Globe: The house of nature 
Nature is not a thing, a domain, a realm, an ontological territory. It is (or rather it has been during 
the short modern parenthesis) a way of organizing the division (what Whitehead called the 
Bifurcation) between appearances and reality, subjectivity and objectivity, history and 
immutability.  
(Latour, 2010: p. 6) 
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This citation summarizes quite well what nature is and what it is not in Latour’s view. Although I 
spoke before about the hemisphere of nature, it is not a sphere in the sense of a space in which we 
reside. It cannot actually be found on my sister’s globe. It is not the Wehea Forest in Indonesia or the 
Gobi Desert in Mongolia, nor is it Central Park in New York or the Oostvaardersplassen in the 
Netherlands. Certainly, we call this nature, but it is not what Latour speaks of. To him it is rather a 
theoretical notion. Therefore it may be confusing to some to use the term house of nature to address 
it, since it is not a physical place like the houses we inhabit. Nor is it a political house like the House 
of Representatives in the United States of America or the Houses of Commons in Great Britain and 
Canada, although to Latour the house of nature is political in a different way. It has already become 
clear that it is the sphere of science, where scientists represent facts of the real and objective world. 
But there is more to it.  
In his Gifford Lecture series, Latour (2013a; 2013b) uses an ancient tool, a so-called “table of 
translation”, to compare nature with religion. This tool, which he borrowed from Egyptologist Jan 
Assmann, allows Latour to take different societies (he uses the word “collectives”) and distinguish 
and compare their entity (or theos), people (demos) and distribution of agency (nomos). He stresses 
that every collective starts with a people, and when the people disappear their entities vanish as 
well, or at least the names of these entities. Think for example of the gods of the ancient Greeks, 
Romans or Egyptians. However, the agencies that are ascribed to these entities often remain, even 
after the people have long gone. Latour argues that nature is also an entity around which people 
assemble. By putting nature in a “table of translation” he makes it comparable to the entity he calls 
religion, although in the view of the people of nature their entity is not supernatural. Nevertheless, 
the people believe that this entity is what refers to the truth. For them nature is the way to 
understand or explain the world, because they view their entity as the (original) source or distributor 
agency (the power to act). They assign certain characteristics to the distribution of agency under 
their entity. Similarly, Latour argues, the people of religion gather around a deity, which represents 
truth and distributes agency (again: demos, theos and nomos). Thus, by comparing people, entities 
and agency in this way, Latour rightfully places the people of nature, also known as the moderns, in 
the house of society. This is an important point to emphasize. Despite the name that is used here 
(the people of nature) they do not actually live in the house of nature. Remember, Latour is seeking 
to study the anthropology of the moderns as it is one of the societies (cultures) in the multicultural 
world. As we have seen, the moderns believe that there is one common nature, but many cultures. 
This view is in itself a cultural view. Therefore, other cultures do not necessarily view nature and 
culture as separated, or view the world in a mononaturalist way. Latour thus shows that the 
moderns, the people of nature, have more in common with the people of religion than they might 
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think. But does this mean that their entity, Nature, is simply a replacement for a god? And therefore 
that their views are equally true or false as those of other cultures? For Latour, this is a relativist view 
and he distances himself from that (2004; 2010; 2013a). I will return to this question of relativism in 
the chapter on compositionism. 
As always there is another layer, another divide, Latour wishes to explore. In the first two of his 
Gifford Lectures (2013a; 2013b) he does not just compare nature with religion. In fact, he observes a 
divide within the house of nature itself. There are two sides, which he calls “Nature One” and 
“Nature Two”4. Once again, I wish to make an analogy with the image of my sister’s globe. Picture 
the half that represents the house of nature. There is an outside, always visible to us and it shows the 
world as we know it. We do not need any help to see the world as it is, other than our eyes. And 
there is an inside, usually hidden from us, unless we want to replace the light bulb inside. We can use 
the outside as a metaphor for “Nature One” which refers to a theoretical or ideal view of the house 
of nature under the Modern Constitution5. In contrast, the inside symbolizes “Nature Two”, which 
refers to the house of nature in practice. In other words, it refers to the scientific practice that is also 
usually hidden from us. We see, hear or read about the outcomes of scientific studies, but unless we 
are scientists ourselves we do not see how the outcomes are produced. Moreover, we do not think 
of these outcomes, or facts, as produced. We see them as a given. Therefore, even though Nature 
Two is closer to reality than the rather utopian Nature One, the latter had (and still has) a major 
influence on the perception of the house of nature. This is exactly what was illustrated in the 
“climategate” scandal, which was already mentioned in the prologue. Emails were leaked and 
revealed deliberations between climatologists and the use of references, models and instruments. 
This practice (Nature Two), which is usually hidden inside the house of nature, now became public. 
This caused a heated debate about the way the reports on climate change were produced, rather 
than a discussion of their conclusions. According to Latour (2010: p. 7), even scientists could not 
defend this scientific practice as an inescapable reality, proving they were caught up in the ideal view 
of nature as an unmediated sphere. Apparently they did not realize that the ideal of the house of 
nature (Nature One) is just that: a theoretical ideal with little in common with the practice of Nature 
Two. In the next paragraph I will continue my discussion of Nature One, after which I will return to 
the topic of Nature Two in paragraph 2.3.2. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 There is also a divide within religion, logically called “Religion One” and “Religion Two”, but I will return to 
that in paragraph 2.4. 
5
 See figure 1. 
30 
 
2.3.1. Nature One 
In the first Gifford Lecture (Latour, 2013a) Latour lists four attributes of the entity Nature One. These 
attributes are what defines the distribution of agency (nomos), according to the demos. First of all, 
Nature One is outside. By this, Latour means that it is independent of its people, beyond them. The 
people have no saying over what this entity does, which is the reason why the people assemble 
around it. It is an outside authority that cannot be altered simply because the people want it: nature 
‘is not negotiable’ (Latour, 2013a). It is not influenced by human will. The second attribute of Nature 
One is that it is unified. It means that it holds universal (natural) laws that apply to all agencies. This 
universalist supposition is where mononaturalism stems from. For Latour, this is a premature 
conclusion, as we shall see in the next paragraph. The third attribute is that Nature One ‘deals only 
with inanimate agency’, it is de-animated (2013a). This refers to the idea that objects, or non-human 
agencies, are not animated. They are nothing more than the consequences of their causes. To speak 
of “inanimate agency” is then an oxymoron, since agency of course means the power to act. The 
explanation of the people of Nature One, is that the inanimate objects do have agency but only that 
which they got from their causes. Finally, the fourth attribute is that the agencies of Nature One are 
undisputable. Although it may appear akin to the first attribute, it is indeed different. It means that 
under Nature One we deal with objects, that are considered to be matters of fact, not matters of 
opinion. Therefore, they cannot be disputed. 
We have now explored the attributes of Nature One. Who then, are the people of this entity? 
According to Latour, it can be anyone (2013a). It may be scientists but also lay persons. And the 
theos, the entity that Latour now calls Nature One, was previously referred to as Science (singular, 
capital S) (Latour, 2004; 2010). In Politics of Nature (2004) Latour describes Science as a discourse 
that is different from the practice of the sciences, and defines it as ‘the politicization of the sciences 
through epistemology in order to render ordinary political life impotent through the threat of an 
incontestable nature’ (Latour, 2004: p. 10). What he means here, is that speaking “in the name of 
Science” is a political tactic, which is used to end discussions. If Science says something is the way it 
is, who are we to argue? It becomes obvious that this seems to give scientists an enormous power. 
However, as we have seen and shall explore even further in the next paragraph, there is 
simultaneously a conflicting practice next to this discourse.  
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2.3.2. Nature Two  
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, Nature One has certain characteristics. But remember, 
this was merely the outside layer of the hemisphere of nature. On the inside we find Nature Two, or 
the practice of the house of nature. We will see that this has very different, indeed often opposing, 
features (Latour, 2013a). First of all, whereas Nature One is outside, Nature Two is inside. This means 
that although in theory nature is supposed to be independent of its people, in practice it is through 
the instruments of people (scientists of various disciplines) that the moderns are able to speak of 
nature. Whatever can be said about nature, it is based on human made datasets, measurements, 
calculations, observations and experiments. This is not to say that nature has no truth to it, but it 
cannot be separated from human action. What is observed, recorded, tested is translated into 
words, models and images that tell us something. If that scientific work is done well, and repeatedly 
it is represented in a good way. If not, then it is badly represented. The second attribute of Nature 
One is that it is unified. Nature Two on the other hand is not unified but multiple (Latour, 2013a). By 
this, Latour refers to the large quantity of scientific disciplines, each of which has its own 
organizations, institutions and paradigms. He compares it to a legal system in which laws, 
jurisprudence and codes are intertwined in a complex network6. Although processes of unification 
can exist on local levels, where certain rules about specific topics are determined and accepted, it is 
too simplistic to already speak of universal laws of nature. The practice of the sciences is more 
complicated than that. And even if there is a sort of unified nature out there, it is much too early to 
come to that conclusion. So Latour speaks of a prematurely unified nature (2013a; 2013b). As the 
reader may have anticipated, the third attribute of Nature Two is that it deals with animated 
agencies, not the oxymoronic “inanimate agencies” of Nature One. On the contrary, the scientific 
practice shows an increase in the number of non-human agents that have an influence on courses of 
action. They might add to their cause or cause new actions, or both.  This does not mean that non-
human actors, or actants as Latour calls both human and non-human actors, all of a sudden have a 
soul or a spirit. It simply means that whether you call them animate or inanimate, they still keep on 
acting in the same way, nothing more and nothing less. Finally, the fourth attribute of Nature Two is 
that its agencies are disputable, and in fact disputed. Whereas in Nature One objects are 
indisputable, in Nature Two there are debates on objects. However, they are usually just between 
scientists and thus hidden from the public or from politicians. The objects that are eventually 
established are presented as matters of fact, with little attention to the process of proof and peer 
review that preceded them. “Climategate” was one example of where the dispute over objects 
                                                          
6
 Latour studied the process of lawmaking in his 2010 book The Making of Law: an Ethnography of the Conseil 
d’Etat. 
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became very clear. This is the practice of Nature Two out in the open. (More on objects and matters 
of fact in paragraph 2.3.3). 
Latour argues the demos of Nature Two consists of scientists. And the entity is obviously the field of 
sciences (plural, small s) (Latour, 2013a; 2013b). To be more precise, it is the field of natural sciences, 
but not the social sciences. 
 
2.3.3. Matters of fact versus matters of concern 
In Politics of Nature Latour distinguishes two types of objects within political ecology. There are risk-
free, smooth objects (matters of fact) and risky, tangled objects (matters of concern). (Latour, 2004: 
p. 22-25) The reader should keep in mind that a fact is not necessarily a political issue. For example, 
that the heat of the sun warms our planet is a fact. But when this heat becomes problematic (for 
example in case of global warming or drought) then it is a political issue, or: a political matter. And 
within political matters we can distinguish matters of fact (established by the sciences) and matters 
of concern (not yet established). 
Matters of fact are ‘the indisputable ingredients of sensation or of experimentation’ (Latour, 2004: p. 
244). They can be characterized by the following features (Latour, 2004). First, its boundaries, 
essence and properties are well-defined. Second, once this matter of fact is established (when the 
object is finished), the network of people behind it (the scientists, entrepreneurs and technicians 
who conceive and produce them) becomes invisible, hidden. The third characteristic is that although 
these objects have (either expected or unexpected) consequences, they are regarded as separate 
from the world they impact. Thus the objects are regarded as coming from outside to impact a 
different, a social world. Latour compares this to the impact of meteors that come from “another 
world” and crash into the Earth. However, this impact does not change the original description of the 
object. The object is still the same. In other words, once these objects are defined and established, 
they stay the way they are and that is how they are perceived. Latour uses the example of asbestos, 
which was once thought of as a wonderful substance, until years later, after many incidents and 
research, it was declared to be extremely dangerous. The damaging quality was undisputable, 
therefore political action could be taken quite easily and it was clear what needed to be done. 
Then there are objects that are not so easy to define but still need our attention. These are matters 
of concern which features contrast those of matters of fact. First of all, they do not have well-defined 
boundaries and essences and they are not completely separated from their environment, they 
become entangled in rhizomes and networks. Furthermore, they are defined by scientific, 
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technological or industrial production. And the producers and their tools are highly visible. Thirdly, 
while these objects do have impact on their environment, but they do not impact a world that is 
different from their own. Finally, the objects are not disconnected from their unexpected 
consequences. In fact, unexpected consequences are, how paradoxical, expected. And when they 
arrive they do change the definition of the object, because lessons are drawn from them. This time, 
Latour uses the example of prions. These abnormal proteins have been linked to BSE, or mad cow 
disease, but it is not beyond dispute that they are indeed causing the illness. Unlike the hazardous 
asbestos, the prions are hard to define and isolate. And still, their suspected relation to BSE triggers 
alarm. The prions are not matters of fact, but they are matters of concern. (Latour, 2004: p. 24, 25, 
51, 75) 
According to Latour (2004: p. 24-25) the world is increasingly made up of matters of concern. Instead 
of just giving us more certainty about the world, the sciences produce uncertainty by revealing more 
and more objects that are uncertain and might disrupt our world. Even facts are not safe. The once 
so wonderful and harmless asbestos is now a terrible danger, threatening to make us sick. What 
other things will become issues and give us concerns? Thus, a fact is not necessarily eternally true. 
Differently put, 
the fact of the matter is that matters of fact are in great risk of disappearing like so many other 
endangered species. Or else they deal with trifling subjects of no interest to anyone anymore. 
Rare now are topics where you do not see scientists publicly disagreeing among  themselves on 
what they are, how they should be studied, financed, portrayed, distributed, understood, cast. 
Facts have become issues. 
(Latour, 2010: p. 13) 
Finally, Latour argues that matters of concern are very important in politics, because ‘[w]e might be 
more connected to each other by our worries, our matters of concern, the issues we care for, than by 
any other set of values, opinions, attitudes or principles’ (Latour, 2005a: p. 4). The Modern 
Constitution  is not equipped to deal with these matters of concern, in which facts and values are so 
terribly mixed up. 
 
2.3.4. The house of nature 
It has become clear that the idea of the house of nature is problematic. What Latour calls a ‘bifocal 
nature of nature’ (2013a), or the contradictions between Nature One and Two, indicates that the 
way we speak about nature (or Science) is not necessarily a fair representation of it. Once again, the 
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approach of Nature One (interiority, unification, de-animation and indisputability) is an extreme form 
of reductionism in Latour’s view. But, as we have seen in the prologue of this thesis, reductionism 
does have a function in the practice of the sciences. But the sciences are more nuanced and complex. 
Yet in public and political debates Science is often used as a way to end a discussion. The so-called 
“New Atheists” for example rely heavily on Science in their discussion with theists (or other atheists). 
These outspoken people, like famous biologist Richard Dawkins, tend to use the arguments of 
unification and indisputability of Science. For example, they simply state that it works7, without 
explaining what works exactly or referring to the nuances of the sciences. Or they rely so much on 
the idea that scientific facts speak for themselves and think do not need an act of persuasion to be 
accepted8. This is not to say that they have only this discourse of Science and never noticed the 
practice of sciences, but it does illustrate that these people of the house of nature are not always 
able to publicly reconcile the contradictions of Nature One and Two. Quite possibly, these people 
would have great difficulties accepting Latour’s view and even accuse him of relativism. After all, how 
could facts become issues? Even more so because Latour has stated that he is ‘as interested in 
chanting the glory of God as the objectivity of the sciences’ (2013a). However, if they believe that he 
is too hard on the house of nature and too soft on culture, and especially religion, they should think 
again. And continue to read.9  
 
2.4. Second hemisphere of the Modern Globe: the house of society 
For purely anthropocentric —that is, political— reasons, naturalists have built their collective to 
make sure that subjects and objects, culture and nature remain utterly distinct, only the first ones 
having any sort of agency. 
(Latour, 2010: p. 12) 
Now that we have some idea of what the house of nature represents under the Modern 
Constitution, it is time to turn our attention to that other hemisphere, that of society. To the reader 
it may prove to be no less complicated and perhaps even more eccentric than Latour’s interpretation 
of nature. Hopefully, the prologue has prepared them for this next domain of Latour’s remarkable 
view. 
                                                          
7
 See Dawkins argue that science works: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eob371ZgGoY  
8
 See for example astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson argue this before Dawkins and what the latter’s response 
is: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_2xGIwQfik  
9
 As we have seen in the Prologue an important feature of compositionism is that it is searching for universality 
but without believing that this universality is already there, therefore it is neither relativistic nor universalist. 
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Remember, we are discussing the organization of representation under the Modern Constitution. 
While the house of nature is, at least in theory, supposed to represent the objective reality of non-
human agency, the house of society is thought to represent subjectivity and appearances. It is the 
domain of humans, opinion, values, culture, religion, beliefs, and other forms of social construction 
(Latour, 2004; 2010). 
The perceptive reader will have noticed that the citation at the beginning of this paragraph strongly 
resembles the one with which I opened the previous paragraph. However, this time the bifurcation is 
approached from the side of politics, or society. It is meant to illustrate once more that these houses 
cannot be thought separately, since they were both established out of the same division. This 
establishment is political in itself (Latour, 2004; 2010). Science has the enormous power to represent 
non-humans, objectively, as matters of fact.  Simultaneously this means that these non-humans are 
excluded from the house of society. In other words, because they are thought to be objects, without 
any interests they are mere inanimate props in the political arena of animated human beings. It is 
now clear that this exclusion cannot be maintained. Non-human agents (actants), in practice, are 
animated and are connected to each other and to human agents. They have influence and (political!) 
interests. Consequently, for Latour, society has to be extended with non-human actants. In the 
chapter on compositionism I will come back to this issue. 
 
2.4.1. Religion One and Two 
Meanwhile, although the house of nature already seems ruined, there is obviously no reason to fully 
destroy the house of society. The multiple cultures remain, although perhaps not intact. In his Gifford 
Lectures, Latour not only comes to the conclusion that there is a Nature One and a Nature Two, but 
also that there is a Religion One and Two (2013a; 2013b). The goal of these lectures was to 
decompose the pleonasm of Natural Religion. Therefore he uses the “table of translation” to 
compare the people of Nature with the people of Religion, more specifically the people of 
Catholicism. Obviously, I will not go too deeply into the attributes of this particular religion, since this 
would not benefit this study. However, the distinction between Religion One and Two is relevant and 
useful for the present discussion, as it gives an indication of the problems that arise from cultures. 
Latour argues that there is a difference between religious theory and religious practice, which is 
quite similar to Science and sciences. In the article10 “Thou shall not freeze-frame” (2010b) he also 
distinguishes religion from religious experience and shows that to talk about religion is not the same 
                                                          
10
 The article was originally published in Science, Religion, and the Human Experience (James D. Proctor, ed.) in 
2005, but later republished in an adapted version in Latour’s On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods (2010).  
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as to talk religiously. In the Gifford Lectures (2013a; 2013b) Latour opposes theory and practice by 
the following attributes: exteriority and incarnation, unified and trinity, over-animated and salvation, 
undisputable and proximity. For my discussion it is especially relevant to note that among people of 
religion there is also premature unification of the world. For them, their God is the source and 
creator and is already determined and it cannot be disputed.  
 
2.4.2. The people of religion versus the people of science 
In the same way as some atheists refer to Science to kill a discussion, the people of religion refer to 
their deity (or more often their Holy Books, the Bible or Quran). At which point you have nothing left 
to talk about. Latour (2010b) argues that there is or should be more to religion. The way you speak 
should transform the listener. In other words: your words have to have meaning to be persuasive. 
Just like it usually is not enough to speak of matters of fact to convince others, it is not enough to 
speak about religious claims. Atheist or people from other faiths will respond with critical questions 
about the truth of these claims, they will likely respond by saying ‘That cannot be true, your religion 
is false, absurd’. But, according to Latour, both the claims and the responses are in different modes. 
Asking a question from one mode to another would be wrong, it is asked ‘in the wrong key’ (Latour, 
2010b: p. 108). And, obviously, to make a good composition it is very important to work in the right 
key.  
Another thing that applies to the communication between people of science and to people of 
religions, is that they tend to “freeze-frame” (Latour, 2010b, p. 114-115). This refers to the use of 
isolated images in both sciences and religions. In science an image is achieved through all kinds of 
instruments, models and calculations. When we look at an image of a DNA-strand it is a 
representation of what has been observed, it is not the actual thing. The image gets its credibility not 
by itself, but through the work that has preceded and followed it. It is part of a chain of reference 
(even if you do not see it). Therefore, isolating the image and ignoring the rest of the chain will not 
do science justice. Similarly, religious images (like icons, symbols, paintings, etcetera) are part of a 
bigger chain of reference, and it is through their connections that they get their meaning. They 
symbolize something and just taking one image and respond to it in isolation does not do justice to 
the religion it belongs to. Likewise, a movie is more than one frame, and the series of frames must be 
moving to get the picture. Thus, “Thou shall not freeze-frame” is Latour’s interpretation of the 
second commandment. It is forbidden to make or take just one image (or idol) because you will make 
it more important than it is. The image should not be worshipped, nor should it be torn down for 
what it merely is. The destruction of images (icons) is what is called “iconoclasm” and it is what 
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Latour wishes to replace with “iconoclash” (Latour, 2010c). This means that instead of trying to tear 
down the icons of others for what they are, we should talk about their meanings. Or, as he put it in 
An attempt at writing a “Compositionist Manifesto”, iconoclash is ‘the suspension of the critical 
impulse, the transformation of debunking from a resource [...] to a topic to be carefully studied’ 
(Latour, 2010: p. 5). 
To what extent Latour’s evaluation of science and religion (One and Two) would be similar if it 
concerned other non-modern cultures, is a topic for another thesis. Nevertheless, the lessons that 
we draw from it are important. Premature unification, freeze-framing and iconoclasm are to be 
avoided if we want to compose the common world. That is, if we want to organize the world in a 
compositionist way. 
 
2.4.3. The social sciences 
Another important aspect of the house of society is that of the social sciences. So far we have 
learned in what way Latour scrutinizes the natural sciences, however the social sciences also have to 
take some punches. They are just as much a power that keeps the divide in place. First of all, they 
agree with the natural sciences that there is indeed a divide between the human and the nonhuman 
world. Moreover, the social sciences have their own version of premature unification. Not a 
unification of Nature, but of Society. Their social explanations have been used to explain and define 
societies, thereby leaving little room for irregularities or changes. Just like the natural world, the 
social world has been unified too early, and as we will see later, it has to be slowly composed, and no 
longer separated from the natural world. (Latour, 2004: p. 225; 2005b) 
 
2.5. A bifurcated globe in pieces 
Four centuries later, micro and macrocosm are now literally and not simply symbolically 
connected and the result is a kakosmos, that is, in polite Greek, a horrible and disgusting mess! 
And yet a kakosmos is a cosmos nonetheless… At any rate, it certainly no longer resembles the 
Bifurcated nature of the recent past where the primary qualities (real, speechless, speaking by 
themselves, but alas, devoid of any meaning and any value) went one way, while the secondary 
qualities (subjective, meaningful, able to talk, full of values, but, alas, empty of any reality) went 
another. 
(Latour, 2010: p. 10) 
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It has become clear that under the Modern Constitution, there are supposed to be those who 
represent facts, and those who represent values. In contrast to that messy world of values, with all 
its disputes, the world of facts is supposed to be the same for everyone, and thus indisputable. 
Without dispute, it must be the ultimate way to peace, since the more we know about nature, the 
more we will all hold the same world view. This idea of progress can obviously not be maintained.  
While the modern culture lies in ruins, the western world still remains and has to reconcile its flawed 
past with the present. If we accept this Latourian view, it is not difficult to understand why in so 
many ways the West is now working to reinvent itself. We see this not only in the financial and 
economical systems but also in the heated debates on religion and secularism. The West simply does 
not know how to properly reconcile economics, religion, atheism and science in politics. And it is 
certainly true for the ecological crises, as should be obvious by now. By understanding and organizing 
the world through the artificial Modern Constitution, its people have not learned how to survive on 
their planet. With the disappearance of the house of nature and the house of society, 
mononaturalism disappears as well. There is not a single nature to speak of. Or to be more precise: 
not yet, not prematurely. This is why, as we have seen, Latour declared the “end of nature” and 
proposed the terms pre- and multinaturalism. As multiculturalism is only serving as a counterpart to 
mononaturalism, this too disappears. This is reason for Latour to propose another way of re-
organizing the world. It means the reintroduction of the multiverse (2013b). By this Latour refers to 
another political arena for society, or as he calls it: collective, since society still has that connotation 
with relativism. By approaching the world this way, it is  
possible to let the other collectives stop being cultures and give them full access to reality by 
letting them compose their cosmos, but by using other keys, other modes of extension than the 
one allowed by knowledge production. Such a reinterpretation is especially relevant today 
because, if nature is not universal, climate might be a new way to understand anthropology. The 
reintroduction of climate and atmosphere as the new common cosmopolitical concern gives a 
new urgency to this communality between collectives. 
(Latour, 2013b) 
In my view, this makes clear that for any thinker on pluralism, it is worthwhile to consider 
compositionism as a way to bring collectives together. Pluralist thinkers usually tend to address 
questions of organizing human diversity (in religion, culture, ethnicity). However, in the multiverse of 
collectives we need address not only human diversity but also its interrelatedness with non-human 
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diversity. It is an extension of what I have called biocultural pluralism11 (Mijland, 2012). Latour’s 
notion of compositionism gives us an idea how this might be done. 
I hope to have shown you why the image of my sister’s miniature globe is a valid metaphor for the 
problems Bruno Latour wishes to address. Furthermore, I hope you realize that by accepting Latour’s 
definition of these problems, I have shattered my sister’s globe into a thousand pieces and it will 
(and should) never be mended again.  
  
                                                          
11
 Pluralism understood as the active engagement with biocultural diversity, which is the interrelation and 
mutual influence between cultural and biological diversity. The aim of this kind of pluralism is to do justice to 
all world views and life forms. 
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3. Intermezzo: from modernizing to ecologizing 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have had a taste of some problems that Latour associates with the 
Modern Constitution. Before we move on to compositionism, I will briefly describe some of the main 
problems, in order to get a sense of what Latour is trying to overcome by conceiving a different 
constitution. The first set of problems that Latour associates with the Modern Constitution is caused 
by the distinction between Nature and Society, or facts and values. These problems can be viewed as 
three modes of modernizing the world. The second cluster of problems is related to the demise of 
the Modern Constitution. It indicates that it is no longer possible or even desirable to modernize the 
world, and they lead Latour to argue that the world should be ecologized instead. 
 
3.2. Three modes of modernizing 
Modernizing the world is a way of maintaining or even strengthening the divide between Nature and 
Society, between facts and values. We are already acquainted with the first mode of modernizing, in 
which the distinction has kept science and politics in separate domains. The scientist deals with facts 
and Nature, the politician deals with values and Society. The work of the first has little to do with that 
of the latter and, save for the occasional exchange of information between the separate houses, 
these two rarely come together. The scientist and the politician do not even realize that the 
distinction between them is political in itself. Latour describes this mode as the operation of 
(political) epistemology, the parentheses indicating that the knowledge production of Science is 
shielded from politics.12 (Latour, 2004: p. 13, 15) 
The second mode that Latour distinguishes is the operation of political ecology13, which claims to 
defend nature (this time meant as flora and fauna). Through this kind of political ecology the “green” 
politicians or activists try to protect endangered birds and trees and whatnot. However, they do so 
by using the facts that come out of the house of nature. They use facts to push their (“moral”) 
agenda, to silence the others in the house of society because surely the facts cannot be disputed. 
                                                          
12
 Once again a reference to climategate is appropriate. When science and politics were obviously mixed up, 
scientist still insisted that they were not involved in politics. They claimed to simply be stating the facts. 
13
 It may be somewhat confusing that Latour uses this same term, political ecology, to describe his own concept 
compositionism. But it should become clear that once this mode of operation is slightly modified, it gains a 
whole new meaning. 
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And thus, other values have to give way. How very democratic! Despite their good intentions to bring 
nature and politics together, the bifurcation is still at work.14 (Latour, 2004: p. 5, 19-23)  
The last mode of modernizing is the operation of political economics. Political economists have a 
rather peculiar place in the Modern Constitution. On the one hand, they describe facts. On the other 
hand, they prescribe what must be done. In other words, they determine what is and what ought to 
be. And they calculate of course. Facts and values are mixed up, undistinguishable, and the political 
economist is a politician and scientist at once. They search for value in facts, and for facts to support 
their values. And thus they feel no need to take part in political negotiations (for they deal with 
indisputable laws of economics), nor to meticulously describe scientifically what issue they might be 
dealing with (for they need make a normative judgement, and quickly). They simply calculate what 
the best decision is.15 (Latour, 2004: p. 132-135) 
We have now seen how various professions deal with the construction of the Modern Constitution. 
Although it is obvious that they do not always perform effectively, these professionals do have skills 
that are useful under the new Constitution. Their new job descriptions will be given in the following 
chapter. 
 
3.3. The end of the Modern Constitution 
In addition to the problems that are caused by the Modern Constitution , there are a number of 
reasons for Latour to develop a new way to approach and organize the world.  First of all, now that 
the Modern Constitution lies in ruin, something has to give its people a sense of who they are. 
Furthermore, the ecological crisis demands an adequate response from humanity which cannot be 
reached without some sort of organizing principle. Last but not least, Latour wants to give a new 
meaning to the notion of progress.  
                                                          
14
 This is why it was so amusing when early 2013 Dutch newspaper Trouw published a series of articles in which 
the sustainability movement was equated to religion. Obviously, some people in the movement refer to 
Science as the ultimate judge that should settle the disputes on questions of sustainability. The ignorant 
masses should have no voice, but they will be happy once they convert and are saved from impending doom. 
Now replace sustainability with Christianity, Science with God, the ignorant mass with heathens and doom with 
Judgement Day. The resemblance is uncanny. However, the people from the sustainability movement 
responded with fury, and naturally pointed, once again, to the indisputability of Science. Understandably, they 
have limited success in convincing other people in their society. No one likes to be told what to do, and why 
should they change their own precious values? 
15
 Think for example of the euro crisis in the European Union. Dramatic events are followed by even worse 
events, and political economists are constantly trying to come up with new, and temporary, solutions (or 
prescriptions). There seems to be little time for properly redefining the laws that they apply, but do not work. 
‘It is crisis, we need to act, not think!’ seems to be the maxim. 
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3.3.1. Who are “we”? 
This settlement
16
 now lies in ruin but without having been superseded by any other more 
realistic, and especially more livable project. In this sense, we are still postmodern. 
(Latour, 2010: p. 6) 
It seems rather strange that an author who has repeatedly claimed that we have never been modern 
now speaks of being postmodern. However, for a long time people have lived under the impression 
they were in fact modern or modernizing. Even if this proved to be a false impression, in a way there 
is still a postmodern era. A time in which the “never-been-moderns”, to use my own phrase, have to 
find a better way to describe themselves. A description that can replace and follow up modernism at 
the same time. First of all, who are these moderns? In a question and answer session following his 
spoken version of an early draft of An attempt at writing a “Compositionist Manifesto” Latour 
describes the moderns as follows:  
The history of [...] the division between science and society is my shibboleth to describe who is 
modern and who is not modern. [...] Basically everyone who believes in the primary, secondary 
qualities is modern.[...] Everyone who doubts it, is not. Everyone who thinks [we have gone] 
beyond is post-modern. 
(Latour, 2010a) 
Secondly, with the Modern Constitution now in ruins, what remains of these people? In what way 
can they present themselves? In Will non-humans be saved? An argument in ecotheology, Latour 
(2009) argues that the end of modernism has a few consequences with regard to this question of 
what remains. First of all, the “never-been-moderns” of Europe are no longer separated from the so-
called pre-modern “others”. To put it differently, the “others” have stopped being “other”. 
Moreover, the end of modernization has made globalization possible, thereby allowing ‘the 
immensely complex renegotiation of values and features’ (Latour, 2009: p. 460) that every culture is 
a part of today. Quite dramatically, Latour declares that ‘one thing is certain: the planet will no 
longer be modernized.’ (Latour, 2009: p. 460). He continues by acknowledging that it is not enough 
to simply say what “we” have not been. If not modern, what were “we”? Latour claims that the task 
of creating another “Great Narrative” would be too big for him. Yet there has to be something more 
than ‘negative, self-critical, or [...] postmodern claims’17 (Latour, 2009: p. 460) with which the 
Europeans can take part in that complex global renegotiation.  He proposes to define the various, 
often conflicting, traits that are a part of European history. These traits form the essence of the 
                                                          
16
 Obviously ‘this settlement’ refers to the Modern Constitution. 
17
 Again, a reference to postmodernism, but this time as a philosophical term, not to a period of time. 
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Europeans. They are the ‘original ways of speaking truthfully’ (Latour, 2009: p. 460). If you take these 
away it is no longer possible to speak of a European. Latour claims to have distinguished at least 
dozen of these traits. Among them are science, law and indeed religion, which despite the influence 
of modernity has never disappeared from the modern world. To do justice to one’s own trait, one 
should not speak of them. Instead, one should speak scientifically, legally or religiously18. In other 
words, these traits have to speak in their own voice. And these voices have to be recognized as part 
of the “Great European Narrative”, instead of being dismissed by using the old modern ploy of 
rejecting something that was not based on Scientific naturalism, but on religious or superstitious 
supernaturalism. Obviously, for those who speak religiously19 the reversed argument is true. For 
Latour it is a matter of accepting different forms of ontological pluralism. The importance of this 
project to define a new “Great Narrative” lies in the observation that the former “others” are already 
trying to define it for and without the Europeans. (Latour, 2009: p. 460-461)  
We could say that there are no more “others”, since they have stopped being “other” to the 
moderns as soon as they realized they were just like them. But at the same time there are still 
various groups of humans (and non-humans) who are all defined in a different way. In Latour’s view 
the Europeans have to redefine themselves, but he speaks very little of those former “others”. This, 
to me, indicates that the former “others” have already defined themselves, since they never thought 
themselves to be modern, thus their settlements are not in ruins. Whether or not this is true is 
indeed relevant, but not so much for the argument of this thesis. What is more relevant, is that it is 
obvious that the consequences of the end of nature or the end of modernism are not limited to the 
puzzled Europeans alone. Their modernist influence has reached far beyond their own borders and is 
embedded in most international institutions, organizations, laws and legislation. This is one of the 
reasons why it is so important to explore new ways of organization and decision making. Not because 
the world has changed, but because we need to do it more justice. And because there are planetary 
challenges all earthlings face. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 So they may say ‘Scientifically/legally/religiously speaking, this is what we can say about the matter’. 
19
 According to Latour (2009, p. 461) this is extremely difficult, since the truth conditions that are required for 
this have nearly disappeared, allowing other (social) types of explanation to take over to explain something. 
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3.3.2. Ecological crisis 
That is the only question worth raising in this Compositionist Manifesto. If there is no durable 
room for us on Pandora, how will we find a sustainable home on Gaia? 
(Latour, 2010: p. 16) 
Pandora is a reference to the fictional planet that the humans and their avatars aim to overtake in 
the movie Avatar. Latour uses this reference to emphasize that we, humans but also other 
inhabitants of Earth, have nowhere else to go in case our planet becomes uninhabitable. There is no 
escape possible to another planet where we can live in similar conditions. In the movie, there is no 
room for the destructive people that wish to settle on Pandora. Both its residents and the planet 
itself successfully ward off this hostile takeover.20 Even in the hypothetical circumstance scenario we 
are able to find and reach a liveable planet like ours, we have to consider the possibility it is already 
inhabited. Therefore, Latour’s goal is to find a sustainable way of living on the planet that we are 
already part of. Latour (2010; 2011; 2013a) borrows James Lovelock’s idea of Gaia, and puts it in 
opposition to nature and instead of Earth, in order to emphasize it has different features than what 
we usually understand when we talk about our blue marble. Gaia is different from Nature because it 
is not yet unified and it is not indifferent to human action, but sensitive. Human actions have an 
impact on her. According to Latour (2013a; 2013c; 2013d) Gaia should be understood as a historical 
concept, or as he proposes to call it, a geostorical21 concept. It is made up by series of interlinked 
processes. Humankind, so far nothing more than a tiny speck in this long geostory, has only just 
begun to understand Gaia. To become even more acquainted with it, people should leave their 
premature unified ideas of it at home, or better yet: throw it out with the garbage. Because as long 
as you hold on to your belief that there is an external, undisputable, already unified world (for 
example, created by God) you will not seek for agreements with people who believe in a different 
world (for example, based on scientific facts). You will simply wait for that ultimate truth about the 
world to be revealed to everyone, or try to convince the others. Then there is no reason to work 
together or compromise to reach a state of peace. If we do want to reach some kind of universality, 
or condition for peace, we have to compose it. Only then can we formulate the answers to the 
ecological crises. Therefore, compositionism, as we shall see, is universalist in the sense that its goal 
is to build a common world. Gaia, in Latour’s view, is a good vantage point because it 
is the most secular figure of the Earth ever explored by political theory. It is because it is not 
already unified that it should be composed, thus becoming the only entity able to mobilize in a 
                                                          
20
 If I have spoiled the movie for the reader, accept my apologies. Although, in my opinion one is better off not 
seeing this movie. Unlike Latour, I thought it was a horrible waste of time and anticipation.  
21
 An admirable attempt to de-humanize the history of Gaia, as well as ward off critique from feminists. 
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new way science, politics and theology. 
(Latour, 2013a) 
In other words, exactly because Gaia’s image is not yet clear, not yet fully nor finally painted, it still 
has to be composed, piece by piece, drawing from all the insights that can be brought to the table. 
This is, at least, if people are willing and able to let their voices be heard. Here we see that what 
compositionism takes up from relativism is the knowledge that the common world cannot be 
composed from homogeneous voices, while at the same time recognizing that the heterogeneous 
voices will at best make a fragile composition. How this rather ambitious task should be done will be 
the subject of the following chapter. 
 
3.3.3. A new way to progress 
It is as if we had to move from an idea of inevitable progress to one of progressive, tentative and 
precautionary progression. It is still a movement. It is still going forward. But [...] the tenor is 
entirely different.  
(Latour, 2010: p. 3) 
In the prologue we learned that the modern idea of progress was like escaping from the past, 
without looking ahead. Science was supposed to help the moderns get rid of old beliefs and 
superstition, to make them more natural, and thus more rational. In many ways, for many people it 
has done that. Yet, Nature has not been ‘the ultimate referee’22 (Latour, 2013a; 2013e) that could 
settle every dispute. It has only been partly able to replace religion and superstition. However, under 
the influence of modernism, religion has indeed been weakened. Not only by the successes of the 
sciences and atheist movements, but also because modernism ‘deprived it of its energy, restricting it, 
as Whitehead [...] said, to mere furniture of the soul’23 (Latour, 2009: p. 463). As usual, Latour (2009) 
speaks here of Christian theology, in which non-humans once (in the “pre-modern” era) had a central 
place, as well as in Christian art, rituals and spirituality. Under the influence of modernity, this got 
lost and so “modern” Christianity has little to add to the new goal of ecologizing the world (see 
Latour, 1998; 2004; 2009), as opposed to modernizing it. Similar to the sciences having to re-connect 
the micro- and macrocosm, (Christian) religion has to re-connect with the fate (not faith!) of non-
                                                          
22
 A referee can be seen as the mediating third party that settles disputes by providing the ultimate truth, yet 
under a new Constitution, there is no longer a prematurely unified entity that can play this role. (See Latour, 
2013e). 
23
 See: Alfred North Whitehead (1926). Religion in the making. New York: Fordham University Press. 
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humans24. Only then, compositionism as a way of ecologizing the world has a chance for bringing 
progress. This time not by fleeing a horrible past in a backwards movement while destroying the 
future behind us, but by going forward into the future. Or rather, by looking at prospects (Latour, 
2010, p. 15). Certainly, no one can predict exactly what will happen, but by looking forward and see 
what is coming at us, and what consequences our progressive movement has, we can better 
estimate the challenges that come to us. These prospects, or scenarios, will have to be adjusted by 
whoever or whatever interferes with it. This is why a composition will likely never be finished. Time 
and again, there will be a new matter of concern that will appeal to the collectives and demand a 
recomposing of the common world. Progress is no longer defined as the movement along an 
irreversible path, but rather a continuous process of loops with an outcome that is unknown 
beforehand. 
 
3.4. Ecologizing the world 
Now that we have enough reasons to label the Modern Constitution as science fiction, we can move 
to the final part of this exploration of Bruno Latour’s multifaceted work. In the following chapter 
compositionism will be discussed as Latour’s replacement for modernizing, his way of ecologizing the 
world, which he defines as ‘creating the procedures that make it possible to follow a network of 
quasi-objects whose relations of subordination remain uncertain and which thus require a new form 
of political activity adapted to following them’ (Latour, 1998: p. 22). Hence, compositionism is a 
Latourian political ecology. 
 
  
                                                          
24
 Hence the title of the article Will non-humans be saved? This is meant not as saving the planet, but Salvation 
for the planet. 
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4. Fugue II: Compositionism  
 
4.1. Introduction 
At last, we have arrived at the main chapter of this part of my thesis. In the previous sections we 
have already had a glimpse of what compositionism might be. Now it is time to fully dive into it. I 
have to reiterate that this is my interpretation of compositionism, and it is primarily based on Politics 
of Nature but other spoken and written work will be included as well. First I will explain some core 
concepts that are essential for understanding the theory (paragraph 4.2). Then, I will describe the 
new Constitution and its processes that will replace the old Modern Constitution (4.3). Thirdly, I will 
explore the practical skills that are needed for the new political ecology (4.4). Finally, I will address a 
new form of diplomacy (4.5). Once again, I will try to use An attempt at writing a “Compositionist 
Manifesto” as a point of reference. However, that article gives only a small number of clues on the 
procedures of compositionism, therefore references to it will be more scarce than in the preceding 
parts. 
 
4.2. Steps towards Compositionism  
Up to now, we have mainly seen the negative approach of Latour’s argument. We know what he 
opposes, but what does he propose? What does it mean to compose the common world? If the 
Modern Constitution is ruined, will there be a new constitution? How can both humans and 
nonhumans be represented in a single political institution and who represents who, or what? The 
answers to these questions are the steps towards the political ecology of Bruno Latour. 
 
4.2.1. Towards a new Constitution 
This settlement now lies in ruin but without having been superseded by any other more realistic, 
and especially more livable project.  
(Latour, 2010: p. 6) 
Once again we turn to this citation, but this time without the reference to postmodernism. The 
question that I want to direct the reader’s attention to is that of a successor to the settlement of the 
Modern Constitution. Obviously, Latour wishes to replace it. However, although he sketches the 
outlines of a “Compositionist Manifesto”, he gives very few clues as to what a new (Compositionist?) 
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Constitution would look like. This is odd, for that is exactly one of the most important subject matters 
of Politics of Nature (2004), one of Latour’s major works and certainly the most prominent source on 
the compositionist theory, Latour’s new political ecology. Towards the end of the first chapter, 
Latour concludes:  
The combined findings of science studies, political ecology, social sciences, and comparative 
anthropology [...] come together to raise one single question: what collective can we convoke, 
now that we no longer have two houses, only one of which acknowledged its political character? 
What new Constitution can replace the old one? 
(2004: p. 49-50) 
It is important to understand that with the disappearance of Nature, (nonhuman) objects have 
stopped being (non-political) objects. They are not mute, but they now “act” and have influence. 
They are no longer natural in the sense that they are part of a nature that is external to humans. But 
they are not supernatural either. It is not by some miraculous or divine force that they act. In other 
words: nonhumans are now secularized. And the political institution should also be secular. This kind 
of secularism means ‘the abandonment of the impossible dream of a higher transcendence that 
would miraculously simplify the problems of common life’ (Latour, 2004: p. 89). This “higher 
transcendence” refers to the indisputable and external Nature One or to indisputable divinities 
(Religion One). In the new political institution (human) subjects are no longer subjects either, since 
they were only subjects in opposition to objects. Nonhumans and humans once again belong to the 
same (political) realm and are connected in various associations. 
Evidently, the definition of politics has to change after such a radically altered view of who and what 
gets to speak under the new Constitution. Latour proposes to define politics as ‘the entire set of tasks 
that allow the progressive composition of a common world’ (Latour, 2004: p. 53). This common 
world is merely a temporary result, which can and will be recomposed. What is a successful outcome 
for a compositionist? Nobody knows! There is no fixed ambition other than to compose as well as 
possible, and the result is always temporary. Nevertheless, a form of closure has to be achieved, in 
order to have at least a provisional description of a common world. The composers are all those who 
are able to put aside their prematurely unified entities and wish to come to a common 
understanding of reality, on the basis of which this world can be governed25. This means that 
everybody who contributes needs political skills, since the political process is no longer reserved to 
politicians only. And it is no longer exclusively humans who need to be represented, there are 
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 Once again, in my view this does not giving up your beliefs or truths for good, but merely for the purpose of 
politics to reach  common ground with others. Chances are however, that you will change your views outside 
the political realm. 
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representatives for nonhumans as well. The scientists get a (new) political role, less powerful but 
extremely important. And in addition there are many others who need to play a role. I will come back 
to this. This way of doing politics, which includes more than just professional politicians, is not 
entirely new. As Latour (1998: p. 1; 2004: p. 56) himself remarks, it has happened already. At the 
UNFCCC in Kyoto in 1997 for example, where politicians, scientists, researchers, lobbyists and 
industrials came together in the same assembly to discuss emissions of greenhouse gases. It is 
obvious that Latour wishes to strengthen these kinds of political assemblies by developing his 
political ecology. It could offer a more solid foundation to these assemblies. As he puts it: ‘Far from 
designing a world to come, I have only made up for lost time by putting words to alliances, 
congregations, synergies that already exist everywhere and that only the ancient prejudices kept us 
from seeing’ (Latour, 2004: p. 163). However, it is quite complicated to come to a successful 
composition. Some difficulties will be explored in the next two paragraphs.  
 
4.2.2. A new political institution 
And to move collectively, that is, billions of people and their trillions of affiliates and commensals. 
(Latour, 2010: p. 7) 
The first difficulty is to find a new way of “uniting” the former subjects (humans) and objects 
(nonhumans) in a political institution. How do we move collectively? Obviously, we cannot organize 
meetings between humans, pigs, computers, trees, hurricanes, viruses and other nonhumans at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York. That would be as impossible as it would be absurd, not to 
mention fruitless. Rather, we need an organizing principle, much like Nature and Society were. 
Similarly, this would not be ‘a thing, a domain, a realm, an ontological territory’ (Latour, 2010: p. 5-
6). Moreover, it is not possible to just put together the house of nature and the house of society. 
Remember, there are no more objects and subjects! Indeed the institution should be more like an 
extended version of a society or even a democracy, which is also not a place or a thing, but a way of 
organizing. However, democracy has a lot of associations with the house of society and the 
representation of humans26. And a democracy is often simultaneously well-defined as well as ill-
defined. For example, “Germany is a democracy” leads us to believe that this country is a democratic 
body, clearly marked by its borders. But obviously, not every single democratic aspect of Germany 
lies within these borders. Think of the countless ties to Brussels and other international partnerships. 
The borders of Germany’s democracy extend far beyond the geographical borders. Yet still we can 
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 Although in The Netherlands there is a Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren) in the national 
parliament.  
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speak of Germany as a democratic institution. Presumably, Latour’s political institution is even more 
complicated27. It is perhaps for this reason that instead of a society Latour speaks of a collective in 
which humans and nonhumans are assembled (2004: p. 8, 28, 57, 59). Unlike the democracy that is 
Germany, such a collective is neither unified, nor defined along (national) borders. It is even unsure 
how many collectives there might be. There could be one, a couple, a dozen or even more 
collectives. Yet, what is more characteristic of a collective, is that it does the work of collecting into a 
whole that is not divided, like in the old Modern Constitution. Perhaps an analogy with a black hole 
might be enlightening28. A black hole absorbs everything that is in its near surroundings, within its 
event horizon. Upon absorption the black hole does not differentiate between objects and subjects, 
it absorbs all alike. Similarly, a collective does not have a gate where a Saint Peter-like figure decides 
whether you go into nature (heaven?) or society (hell?)29. All humans and nonhumans, all actants, 
come into the same collective. And just as in the case of black holes we do not know how many there 
are. Hitherto, the idea of a collective is still a bit fuzzy. That is why Latour argues 
[t]he more we associate materialities, institutions, technologies, skills, procedures, and 
slowdowns with the word “collective”, the better its use will be: the hard labor necessary for the 
progressive and public composition of the future unity will be all the more visible. 
(Latour, 2004: p. 59) 
 
4.2.3. The citizens of the collective  
The second difficulty is to determine who and what gets to speak in this collective. How do the 
citizens organise themselves? Latour explores this question by taking up the issues of representation, 
association and recalcitrance (2004: p. 62-82).  Let us first turn to the question of representation. 
After all, the collective is made up of so many more actants than the society ever was. Under the 
Modern Constitution objects were presented, rather than represented. The difference is, as soon as 
the scientists were able to agree on the attributes of a nonhuman, for example asbestos, they would 
present it as an objective fact. The long process of studies, grants, scientific debates, and data 
production remained hidden. In a way they were saying ‘this is what it is, end of discussion’ as if they 
had immediate access to the nonhuman object. The subjects of society were to remain silent: they 
were not to question these presentations. However, representation has a different ring to it. There is 
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 I say presumably, because although I have a background in International Relations, I have not studied the 
specifics of the democratic institutions of Germany, but I imagine Latour’s political institution to be more 
diffuse and complex. 
28
 Such a paradox! 
29
 Although in that case Peter would have likely been a scientist, not a saint! 
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no immediate access, but an intermediary. It becomes clear in an instance that someone is doing the 
re-presenting for another. Latour therefore likes to use the word spokesperson. The represented is 
given a voice through the spokesperson and it is clear that there is a whole process before this 
spokesperson starts to speak. Think of politicians, who represent certain groups of people. The 
members of these groups held meetings and conventions, discussed, voted, paid contribution, and 
ended up formulating political agendas. Obviously, this kind of political representation is not always 
transparent and it is rarely completely obvious where the money or certain positions (presentations!) 
come from. When it comes to spokespersons in political matters, whether they are representing 
humans or nonhumans, Latour wants transparency. Other spokespersons and citizens have to be 
able to know and verify whom they are listening to. It is the only way of successfully composing a 
common world. He said it best during his fifth Gifford Lecture: 
Except for tactical reasons, there is no need to hide behind any appeal to the objectivity of 
knowledge, to the undisputable values of human development, to the public good. Rather, tell us 
who you are, who are your friends and foes, who else you want to fight and, yes, tell us clearly by 
which divinity you feel summoned and protected.  
(Latour, 2013e) 
By revealing friends (for example supporters, donors, colleagues) and foes (those who oppose your 
claims) and your divinity (Nature, God, Allah) the spokespersons reveal who and what they stand for 
in the political debate. Only then the nonhumans can be properly represented by the scientists, who 
in their role as spokesperson have to translate what they have discovered in their laboratories, in 
such a way that the nonhumans become relevant in the political debate. (Latour, 2004: p. 64-67). 
Nonhumans become relevant to the political debate when they cause humans to be perplexed 
(Latour, 2004: p. 66), puzzled. They upset the collective, like the prions which are assumed to be 
causing BSE although it remains uncertain. It is indeed a matter of concern, as cows get sick, farmers 
lose cattle and McDonalds sells less hamburgers. Something has to be done, agreement has to be 
reached. This is what is known as the precautionary principle: acting even though you do not have 
certainty about the exact causes or circumstances of a certain imminent danger (Latour, 2010a). 
Obviously, the spokespersons are always human beings. Again, there is no way we humans can let a 
prion, a hurricane or a bird talk for themselves. But how is this different from the purely human 
politics in the house of society? Not in a single representative political gathering is the entire citizenry  
present. But in a representative democracy, there is a solution: humans unite in political parties and 
movements. Latour argues that nonhumans and humans, now that they belong to the same citizenry, 
have to be able to form associations as well. Not based on who or what they are, but how they act. 
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Indeed, they are all actants! They ‘modify other actors30 through a series of trials that can be listed 
thanks to some experimental protocol’ (Latour, 2004: p. 75). To put it differently: an association is 
the work of humans (scientists, researchers), who use nonhumans (instruments, tools, laboratories, 
models) to make other nonhumans (for example the prion) speak. This whole interconnected group 
of humans and nonhumans form an association that is full of uncertainty. Remember, we are dealing 
with matters of concern here. (Latour, 2004: p. 70-77). 
Another point to return to is the agency of actants. As we have seen in chapter two, all actants are 
animated agents. They are not as predictable as was assumed by the people of Nature One. In 
Politics of Nature Latour calls them recalcitrant (2004: p. 77-82). The reason to bring up this 
recalcitrance again is to demonstrate another side of the uncertainty that comes with actants, and 
consequently their spokespersons and associations and ultimately:  the collective.  
To designate the associations of (speaking, associating and recalcitrant) citizens of the collective, 
Latour suggests the term propositions (2004: p. 83). By using the word proposition instead of citizens, 
it is possible to start collecting, to find out who and what becomes part of the collective. The 
associations are proposed to be a part of the collective. The propositions may be introduced as part 
of the collective if they have habits (important qualities that are repeatedly observed but that are – 
at least in theory – possible to change), rather than fixed essences. Habits may become essences, but 
only at the end of the process of the collective (see paragraph 4.3.2). Before the institution of habits 
as essences they have to be well articulated by the entire collective. (Latour, 2004: p. 86-87) 
 
4.3. The new constitution 
Now that we have explored the rough sketches of what a collective is, does and aims for, we can take 
a look at the new Constitution that Latour proposes for the collective (2004: p. 108-116). From here 
on I will call this the Compositionist Constitution31. By consulting figure 2 we can discover a few 
features of the Compositionist Manifesto. First, it consists of two houses. The upper house, which 
has the power to take into account and the lower house, which has the power to arrange in rank 
order. Second, in contrast to the houses of the Modern Constitution, there is no mention of facts and 
values. And in conclusion, we can identify a looping process, made up of four tasks (perplexity, 
consultation, hierarchy, institution). By performing these tasks well (see paragraph 4.5 for the 
required skills) the collective will compose its common world in a good fashion. Progressing now 
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 Actors and actants are the same, the latter having a less anthropomorphic connotation. 
31
 Latour never used this term, but to keep calling it the new Constitution might be confusing. 
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means the process of recollecting or recomposing all the time. This is an experimental process that is 
not defined by the knowledge at the start, but by the quality of the loop32, or what Latour calls the 
learning curve (Latour, 2004; p. 195-196). In this paragraph I will describe the features and workings 
of this Constitution.  
 
 
Figure 2: The Houses of the Compositionist Constitution (adaptation of figure 3.1 in Latour, 2004: p. 115) 
 
To clarify the process I will first present an analogy that might be a bit sinister. I would like to invite 
the reader to think of the collective as a hospital, and of the Compositionist Constitution as the 
emergency room. It is somewhere in the evening and inside the hospital things are pretty quiet. 
Every patient is known and everything is stable. However, outside the hospital there has been a 
major disaster, causing many wounded victims. The paramedics who pick up the victims do not 
decide themselves, prematurely, which victim will go straight into the hospital, but first they bring 
them into the emergency room as potential patients (propositions). The hospital staff has to make 
the decision which patient they will take on. At first the staff is perplexed, they did not expect any 
potential patient to come in and disturb the peace. Perhaps they would even like to say ‘we like to 
keep it quiet, so as not to disturb the other patients, and ourselves’. But obviously, they cannot 
ignore the potential patient. They have to face this external reality. The potential patient is taken into 
the emergency room and all the relevant people in the hospital (experts) are consulted. Together 
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they will decide whether to treat this victim as a patient in the hospital or not. If they do, the next 
step is to decide where among all patients he will be placed, what will be the new hierarchy? And 
when that is decided, the potential patient has to be given a prominent place into the hospital, so 
that he is no longer potential, but a patient like all others. He has become a part of the institution. 
Even if some were not quite comfortable with the new patient, closure had to be achieved to make 
the hospital peaceful again. A similar procedure is taken in the houses of the Compositionist 
Constitution. 
 
4.3.1. The houses 
The first house of the Compositionist Constitution is characterized by the power to take into account 
(Latour, 2004: p. 108-110, 166-172, 181). This means that in this upper house the following question 
has to be answered: ‘How many new propositions must we take into account to articulate a single 
common world in a coherent way?’ (Latour, 2004: p. 110). In other words, the first step in the 
process is to determine which propositions will be discussed. There are two tasks that come with this 
power. The first task is defined as perplexity to meet the requirement of external reality. This means 
that the collective has to take seriously the propositions that come to it, even if they sound ridiculous 
to some. After all we are not dealing with clear definitions here. Once a proposition is brought to the 
attention of the collective – often to their surprise (they are perplexed) – some may find it an 
inconvenience to address it, it cannot simply be left at the gate, ignored. It has to be detected and 
acknowledged. The second task is defined as consultation to meet the requirement of relevance. This 
means that all the relevant tools and people have to be consulted in order to understand and judge 
the importance and qualifications of the proposition and how it will affect the collective. 
The lower house is granted the power to arrange in rank order (Latour, 2004: p. 108-111, 172-181) 
and the core question is ‘What order must be found for the common world formed by the set of new 
and old propositions?’ (Latour, 2004: p. 110). Not only the new proposition but all the propositions 
that were already included in the collective have to put in a new rank order. It has to be decided how 
all the propositions can be part of a common world. The first task is that of establishing hierarchy. 
This means that a new proposition can take the place of an old proposition in the hierarchy of the 
common world. Agreeing on a new hierarchy takes a lot of compromise and adjustment. This task is 
to meet ‘the requirement of publicity33 in the ranking of entities’ (Latour, 2004: p. 110). The second 
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 I find “publicity” to be an extremely confusing term in this context. Either he means that the establishment of 
a new hierarchy is to be done with full disclosure, it has to be made public. This seems logical since he opposes 
it to the secrecy in which hierarchy was established under the Modern Constitution (Latour, 2004: p. 176). But 
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task of the lower house is that of institution to meet the requirement of closure. Once a proposition is 
taken into account and a new hierarchy established, the discussion is closed and the proposition is 
institutionalized. The discussion is closed and should stay closed in order to be able to talk of a 
common world. However, a proposition can always come back to the stage of perplexity to appeal its 
exclusion. Therefore, the houses are part of a looping process.  
Not included in figure 2 are one additional power and three additional tasks. The third power is the 
power to follow up. This is a procedural power, which ‘can serve as a provisional absolute’ (Latour, 
2004: p. 200). Another way to describe it is the power to govern when governing is understood as the 
task of providing simplification and mastering where reductionism mastery are not possible. In other 
words: the power to follow up means to document the process in order to use this documentation in 
successive rounds of collecting. (Latour, 2004: p. 200) This is the responsibility of a new kind of State, 
which is not the same as the collective. Its function is to make it ‘possible to characterize the relative 
fruitfulness of collective experiments, without it being monopolized right away by either scientists or 
politicians’ (Latour, 2004: p. 202).  
The three tasks are performed on a meta-level. The first is guarding the separation of powers (Latour, 
2004: p. 140). It means that the two powers of the houses should be exercised properly and not get 
mixed up. The second additional task is to imagine ways to speak of the collective as a whole. This is 
necessary because the collective is so diffuse and therefore hard to define. In order to get some 
relation to it, there has to be an image or narrative. However, this should not be a definitive answer, 
since that would mean that the work of the collective is already done. Latour calls this task the 
scenarization of the whole. (Latour, 2004: p. 141) The last additional task is the power to follow 
through, which is directly related to the abovementioned power to follow up. This task ensures the 
movement and quality of the process of the collective by continuously documenting the 
characteristics of the collective’s learning curve. (Latour, 2004: p. 200-207) 
 
4.3.2. Beyond facts and values 
Perhaps it has seemed strange to the reader that earlier in paragraph I mentioned the absence of 
facts and values in the Compositionist Constitution. However, not dealing with hard facts and values 
written in gold is exactly what distinguishes compositionism from modernism. “Matters of concern” 
are what the compositionists are all about. But when propositions are instituted into the collective, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
he could also use publicity in its more obscure meaning of “distribution” which then would refer to the 
distribution of all propositions. The combination of connotations would even seem appropriate: the public 
(re)distribution of the members of the (re)public.  
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they must have habits (that are subject to change) or even essences (fixed habits) if they are 
extremely well articulated34 (Latour, 2004: p. 86-87, 139, 175). Again, the hospital analogy might be 
useful. In a hospital doctors do not always rely on or wait for facts. Picture it: a woman is brought in 
with complaints about her leg, obviously causing a lot of discomfort and pain. The leg is swollen and 
blue, but even after consulting many colleagues, medical test results and the patient itself, it is still 
unclear what exactly causes the complaints. Can you imagine the doctor not doing anything, ignoring 
the discomfort and the pain? At the very minimum you would expect him to give his patient a 
painkiller. It is the sensible thing to do and all the people involved would support it. When you 
translate this story to the work of the collective, you will notice that in order to institutionalize a 
proposition, it does not necessarily have to be a fact. Think of the prion. Many things indicate that it 
causes BSE, but it is not a matter of fact. Still, the prion is taken into account and put in a rank order. 
Its existence in the common world is accepted, acknowledged and therefore joint steps can be taken. 
This way the prion is prevented from causing cows to go mad, humans to get sick, farmers to lose 
their business, McDonalds to sell only chicken nuggets and politicians to lose their next election 
because they failed to address the issue. Likewise, global warming does not have to be a fact in order 
to be taken seriously as a matter of concern. Uncertainty is no longer a reason not to take a 
proposition into account. 
However, not everything has to be taken seriously. When you take the reversed situation of the 
woman at the hospital, would it be right to give medication if nothing supported the woman’s claim 
of pain and discomfort? She looks fine, walks normally, and the tests show nothing abnormal. Even 
the psychiatrist cannot find anything out of the ordinary. But she insists on getting medication, it 
seems extremely important to her. Surely the doctor would not give any. It would not make any 
sense, no one would support it, except the woman. The proposition is badly articulated, and thus 
rejected. Translated to the work of the collective, you could take the example of a blue potato. This is 
not yet part of the collective, but presented in a proposition with the claim that it is harmful to 
bananas. The collective takes the proposition into account, but after extensive consultation of test 
results, banana farmers, virologists, biologists and other relevant voices, the collective comes to the 
conclusion that no banana is ever harmed by this blue potato. The blue potato is not accepted as a 
member of the collective. The level of certainty is extremely low, and it is not a matter of concern.  
Another point that is important to emphasize is that this Constitution also makes it possible to 
prevent propositions from entering the collective. It is what Latour calls a control procedure (2004: p. 
99, 120-121). Remember, under the Modern Constitution, facts were established in a hidden place, 
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 Now, habits and essences have gotten a different meaning than before, because they have been given this 
name after they are articulated by the collective, not in advance by scientists. 
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the house of nature. The moment they were presented, the existence of the object could no longer 
be disputed in the house of society. It was there, all of a sudden, and it had to be accepted. Society 
had no voice in it. However, in the Compositionist Constitution this is different. There is no longer a 
house of nature, nor of society, but just one collective in which propositions are approached from all 
angles before they are accepted into the collective. Let me, for the last time, illustrate this by using 
an emergency room analogy. Under the former Constitution, a potential patient with an utmost 
dangerous virus would have been able to come into the emergency room and without any concern 
for the well-being of other patients be taken straight into a hospital wing, thereby infecting all of 
those there, causing dozens of people to die. Only afterwards, the people could complain and argue 
that the patient should have never been accepted in the first place. It sounds dramatic, but when you 
think of the patient as an atomic bomb it sounds not so unreasonable. What if there had been an 
open and decisive debate on whether or not the citizens would accept the proposed atomic bomb 
before it was engineered?  Would it still have been there? 
At the same time, a value can be unproductive as well. As Latour argues, under the old Constitution a 
moralist could block the process by holding on too strongly to a certain idea of what the world ought 
to be, without taking seriously the facts of the matter at hand (2004: p. 98-99, 119-120). And why 
should he? He had no say in it, they were just presented to him, and then he was told to keep his 
mouth shut. However, under the Compositionist Constitution, the moralist has a say in the matter of 
concern, and has to take the proposition seriously. Let me give a simplified example. Imagine a 
Muslim millionaire, a shaman and an atheist tree lover having to discuss about a small forest. It is 
holy for the shaman who wants to perform rituals (proposition) there which involves burning trees 
for the good of the world, while the millionaire wants to build a Mosque in the name of Allah 
(proposition) and the activist insists the forest (proposition) is left alone to remain the lungs of the 
Earth. Then a squirrel that was thought to be extinct is discovered and its saliva cures many diseases. 
The squirrel is another proposition, brought forward by a medical company. Evidence suggests that 
there is one tree there that is essential to the survival of this squirrel, but many of the trees have to 
be cut in order to keep the tree alive. If the millionaire holds on to his belief that Allah want him to 
build the mosque at that exact spot and that it is the best for the world, if the shaman still has to 
burn the trees for his rituals, and if the tree lover insists to save all the trees they get nowhere. If 
they are willing to compose a common world, and to take all the propositions seriously, they are 
involved in the decision making process and presented with all the evidence. They have a voice and 
can take part in the discussion on what is most important to the collective: the mosque, the squirrel, 
the trees or the rituals. Together they decide on what is the good, or better, common world. And no, 
it will not be easy. But compositionism is not about taking the easy road. The progress that is made 
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by composing the common world will lead to more complexity, more uncertainty and more flavours 
of entanglement (Latour, 2004: p. 191).  
From this view on facts and values follows Latour’s interpretation of morality: ‘uncertainty about the 
proper relation between means and ends’ (2004: p. 155). It is based on an extension of Kant’s 
morality: the obligation not to treat human beings and nonhumans as simply as means, but also as 
ends. To Latour, ecological crises are expressions of the “refusal” of nonhumans to be treated as a 
means to human ends. By treating morality as an uncertainty it is always necessary to keep asking 
questions about what is right and wrong. This is one of the skills that is necessary under the 
Compositionist Constitution (see paragraph 4.4). 
 
4.3.3. A new outside, unity and civilization 
As we have seen, before propositions become part of the collective, they come from outside the 
collective. They are external to it. Once a proposition is institutionalized and the hierarchy has 
changed, it is possible that another proposition is now expelled from the collective. This proposition 
is externalized. Latour gives the example of the thousands of people who die every year in car 
accidents in France. In an abstract sense, the lives of these people are considered less worthy of 
being in the collective than the high speed of cars. However, an appeal to the eviction from the 
collective is possible. The propositions can come back to insist that they are taken into account again. 
In addition to this new form of exteriority (the propositions outside the collective), there is a new 
form of reality inside the collective a new unity is being composed by the collective. But it is not a 
given reality, and it is not a given unity, prematurely determined. It is being progressively composed. 
That is what compositionism is all about, finding common ground without believing it is already 
there. (Latour, 2004: p. 122-127) Each day the collective and its exterior are defined anew, through a 
looping process, a looping progress. 
Before, in the modernist settlement, Nature was external to culture. In a way it was transcendent, as 
it was supposed to be the same for all cultures, undisputable and made up of laws and facts. 
However, under the Compositionist Constitution, there is no external or transcendent unified Nature. 
There is another form of transcendence, not unified but multiple: that of the external propositions. 
These transcendences are what make up the environment of the collective. (Latour, 2004: p. 184-
185) From this environment the new citizens emerge, and therefore the collective should always 
treat it with care. External propositions may be enemies at one point, but might become allies later. 
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Therefore Latour defines civilization as the civility with which the collective treats the external 
propositions.35 Defending this civilization is part of the power to follow up. (Latour, 2004: p. 207-209) 
We have now seen only a part of the process that comes with Latour’s political ecology, with 
compositionism. But as always, there is more to it. We still have not all the information on how to 
compose the common world. In the next paragraph I will explore the skills that we need so that we 
can finally learn to compose! 
 
4.4. Job descriptions for the collective 
In Politics of Nature Latour describes the skills that are needed to come to a successful composition 
of the common world (2004: p. 128-183). For each stage or task of the process of the Compositionist 
Constitution, he presents what expertises of scientists (p. 137-143), politicians (p. 143-150), 
economists (p. 150-154), moralists (p. 154-161) and administrators (p. 205) are valuable. In order to 
reach a deeper understanding of each of the process, I will arrange these skills according to the task 
they belong to. When I deem it necessary I will clarify the skill with an example. 
 
4.4.1. Skills for the task of perplexity 
The skills of scientists may be the most important to the task of perplexity. Scientists have the 
expertise to bring propositions into the process of the collective. With their knowledge, instruments, 
laboratories and other scientific tools they have the ability to ‘make the world speak’  (Latour, 2004: 
p. 137). Without them, the propositions would not even (or hardly) be noticed. From politicians 
Latour takes the skill of having a sense of danger that comes from the excluded propositions. As we 
have seen, the process is not a closed one but always in a state of continuation. The excluded 
propositions can come back and the sensitivity of politicians, now in their cooperation with scientists, 
will help to spot them. An example: a virus is thought to cause an illness among certain fish. 
However, the evidence is extremely poor and few fish are actually ill, and so a proposition to take it 
into account is rejected, because it was insufficiently represented (articulated and documented). 
However, as time goes by more fish get sick and more evidence is gathered. Even people are starting 
to get sick. Now, the proposition can come back with a different, perhaps better, representation. The 
politician has the sensitivity to notice it and bring it back in the process. He can say ‘let us take 
another look again’. Economists are very competent to detect and involve propositions because they 
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 In this sense, the moderns have never been very civilized (see Latour, 2004: p. 210). 
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are so focussed on detecting possible attachments between persons and goods (humans and 
nonhumans). After all, they are always thinking of why and how goods (could) become of worth to 
people. Therefore they can imagine combinations of goods and people that are not yet known. This 
skill makes it possible to link the fate between humans and nonhumans more closely. The conscience 
of the moralist will make sure that the collective keeps on looking for excluded entities to take into 
account (again). The administrator has the skill to record data over a long period of time, this helps to 
become more sensitive to what it outside the collective and to keep a focus on what is already inside.  
 
4.4.2. Skills for the task of consultation 
Once the propositions are brought into the process, they have to be judged on their quality. There 
might be many representations of the propositions. There might be controversy or uncertainty about 
the quality of the representations (is the proposition well or badly articulated?). The scientists can 
bring experimental protocols to investigate and decide who among them is best qualified to be 
consulted. Politicians, like no others, know how to gather opinions. They know how to find relevant 
stakeholders and other involved parties and make them be heard. Economists have the skill to make 
the proposition describable. They help the consulted parties to articulate what makes certain 
attachments of interest to them. By the articulation of the different interests in an economic sense, 
economists contribute to the requirement of relevance. The moralist will defend the right of each 
proposition to be properly examined and defined according to its own terms. Administration makes 
the consultation more effective and just by continuously verifying the qualifications of those who 
participate in the discussions. 
 
4.4.3. Skills for the task of hierarchy 
When it comes to deciding a new hierarchy, the scientists can contribute their ability to offer 
innovations and compromises. If older propositions can be modified in order to change their position 
in the hierarchy of the common world, it might be easier to fit in the new proposition. For example, 
proposition A is “a virus that might kill” “five percent of children under the age of 5” (proposition B).  
Surely this is a grave matter. The existence of B trumps the existence of A, thus [B>A]. But if the 
scientists are able to modify proposition B, by inventing “a vaccine that prevent the children from 
becoming infected with A” (proposition C), the relative weight of proposition A will become smaller 
[B>C>A]. However, if the vaccine causes “cancer in 60 percent of all vaccinated children” (proposition 
D), the hierarchy might become different. Perhaps the risk of B becoming infected by the virus is 
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better than 60 percent of all vaccinated children getting cancer at a later stage. The hierarchy is then 
[B>A>C>D]. The existence of the virus is then more acceptable than the vaccine. It is now obvious 
that in the lower house the darker sides of political skills are required. Whereas in the upper house 
the politicians could use their sensitivity and give a platform to many different voices, here they have 
to make compromises (and enemies). In deciding a new hierarchy, the old one gets upset. Thus, 
politicians will have to use their skills to compromise on a result that is best for the common good of 
the collective. This is not always in line with the wishes of their constituents, and for that reason the 
politicians will have to explain the outcome to their following and try to convince them it was the 
best decision. By working closely with scientists they could be able to modify opinions just like the 
scientists modify propositions for more compatibility. Modifications are necessary to come to a 
common world. Economists can provide the common language for establishing hierarchy. It is 
difficult to establish a form of hierarchy in a heterogeneous collection of propositions, but through 
economic calculation it becomes possible to compare different propositions on the same basis. 
Surely, the comparison in economic terms would only be part of the process of establishing a 
hierarchy, not the only way. In order to reach a good common world, there has to be one order, and 
not two. The skill of the moralist is to keep asking for that one order and therefore make impossible 
demands, that forces the scientists and politicians to come up with compromises or innovations that 
make that one rank possible. The establishment of a hierarchy would be impossible without the skill 
of administrators to keep an archive of previous hierarchies.  
 
4.4.4. Skills for the task of institution 
In this phase of the process, when the propositions have been taken into account and placed in the 
hierarchy of the collective, the propositions have to be institutionalised. The scientists have the skill 
to include these propositions in their models, paradigms, laws, etcetera. When it is to be decided 
which proposition is in and which one is out of the collective, the politician’s skill to make enemies is 
valuable. Obviously, exclusion and inclusion of propositions can lead to anger. For example, the 
exclusion of thousands of people that are annually offered for the existence of the fast cars that kill 
them is sure to upset some. But with the requirement of closure comes the need to make decisions, 
and thus enemies. The economists help to justify the provisional end result of the common world by 
the documentation of the new calculations, tables and theories. Because of the necessity of the 
lower house to make decisions, there are propositions that, by their exclusion, are treated as a 
means (again the example of the car crash victims is a good one). The moralist will always question 
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this exclusion and make sure the propositions have the right to appeal. To be able to come to 
decisions, the administrator adds the skill to add procedures to stabilize the collective. 
 
4.4.5. Skills for the task of separation of powers 
To protect the separation of powers, the scientists and everyone else need to have the capacity to 
keep asking their own questions, autonomously. Scientists have mastered this skill to perfection 
under the Modern Constitution, by fiercely claiming their independence, insisting to keep politics out 
of Science. They can put this skill to use in order to protect the autonomy of all in the collective. 
Naturally, the politicians are used to guarding a separation of powers, but under the Compositionist 
Constitution this separation is different. The upper house is characterized by freedom: many 
propositions and voices are heard. The lower house is defined by necessity as it is forced to make 
decisions on hierarchy and in- and exclusion. This divide between the freedom of power to take into 
account and the necessity of the power to arrange in rank order has to be respected. In the upper 
house it is all about attachments between humans and nonhumans for economists. In the lower 
house, however, it is about calculations, which are the way to reduce the attachments to be able to 
compare them. The difference between attachments (in reality, evolving preferences of people) and 
calculations (on paper, reducing reality) is so big that this is the way economists ensure the 
separation of powers. The moralist has the skill to keep the process going. Although the power to 
take into account and to rank in order are two separate powers, they need to continue in their cycle 
of composition and recomposition. This task is mainly the responsibility of the administrators, 
because they should have the skill to guard the procedures of the collective and to avoid getting 
involved in the content of the process. 
 
4.4.6. Skills for the task of scenarization of the whole 
The scientists have now a legitimate way of imagining a unified common world. It is not prematurely 
unified, like Nature was under the Modern Constitution. It has become unified – simplified but 
coherent – through the slow composition of the collective. The biggest difference is that the 
scientists did not unify it alone, but in cooperation with the others in the collective. The collective is 
not a well defined thing with clear borders, but always moving, changing, progressing. Latour 
compares it to ‘the way burning brands trace shapes in the darkness of night only through the rapid 
motion to which we subject them’ (Latour, 2004: p. 148). Therefore, the politician’s skill to create a 
scenario, a narrative through which the members of the collective feel connected to it. In other 
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words: they keep telling the story of the collective as a whole as it keeps changing. Without that 
story, the collective would fall apart. The economists help to tell the story of the collective, because 
economy – rather than an independent sphere – is a reflection of the inside and outside of the 
collective. Economy can serve as a scale model to show what the collective has taken in and what it 
externalizes. The moralist will never be satisfied with any form of scenarization, since the whole will 
always be exclusive to some (the rejected propositions). However, they will also reject a form of 
pluralism that would accept separate worlds, as that would mean abandoning the quest for a 
common world. From the administrator, Latour takes no skill for this task. 
 
4.4.7. Skills for the task of the power to follow-through  
The scientists are used to working with learning curves, which according to Latour they call a 
research front36. It refers to that what is dynamic and competitive in the sciences, instead of what is 
static and accepted. The detection of such a research front is the skill that they add to this task. Like 
the scientists, the politicians know the difference between dynamic and static situations. Therefore 
they can choose opportunities that permit power relations to be reversed. The economists are very 
sensitive to unstable dynamics, so they will ensure the movement that is needed to follow through. 
The moralists guard the quality of the intentions and the directions of the movement of the learning 
curve. The administrators ensure the follow-through by documenting the experimental protocol, the 
trials and failures. 
 
4.5. Inter-collective diplomacy 
When the inside and the outside of the collective have been defined, with civility, it is time to start 
engaging in dialogue with other collectives. Perhaps this could be described as the second phase of 
compositionism. After collectives have (provisionally) established themselves, it becomes possible to 
find other collectives and jointly compose ‘the common world of essential requirements’ (Latour, 
2004: p. 213). The cultural anthropology of the moderns will not be of help in the endeavour of 
comparing and introducing collectives, Latour argues (2004, p. 210-212). This kind of anthropology 
has had a false sense of respect for cultures by merely being interested in their visions and 
representations of the one unified natural world they – the anthropologists – already claim to know. 
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 Although a search online leads to various definitions of research fronts along the lines of “clusters of highly 
cited papers”, see for example http://archive.sciencewatch.com/dr/rfm/ and 
http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/free/essays/research_fronts/.  
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They are basically saying: ‘We know what the world is, but we want to know how you see it.’ As we 
have seen, the rediscovery of multinaturalism also means the end of multiculturalism. In Latour’s 
political ecology, anthropology has to be strengthened by the virtues of diplomacy37 (Latour, 2004: p. 
212-217). A diplomat has a unique position. In a meeting, she (or he38) belongs to one of the involved 
collectives while simultaneously being a potential traitor to all of them. The ecologist diplomat has 
only one goal: to reach the best possible agreement. Therefore, she must take seriously whatever 
comes to the table. Although Latour does not describe the process of diplomatic negotiations in 
detail, there are two aspects that matter to every diplomat. First, it is to find out the essential 
requirements of a collective. A requirement is ‘what cannot be lost without losing the collective’ 
(Latour, 2004: p. 214). Then there is the experimental metaphysics that forms expressions that ‘can 
be given up as the price for an extension of the collective’ (Latour, 2004: p. 214). The metaphysics39 
of a collective is not to be set in stone, otherwise there would be nothing to discuss. Therefore it has 
to be experimental, and thus temporary, just like the whole process of collecting is. In the 
negotiations between collectives, the ecological diplomat has a duty to determine what internalized 
propositions she can and cannot give up in order to stay true to her collective. At the same time she 
is trying to extend the common world with essential requirements of other collectives, which are 
external to her own. This common world of different collectives demands that all the diplomats deal 
with the uncertainty of what they compose together. Compromises have to be made and, again, 
there is no common Nature that can serve as the ultimate referee in the negotiations (see paragraph 
3.3.3). The common world is yet unknown, it has yet to be composed. The temporary expressions of 
experimental metaphysics and the essential requirements will have to be compared. But by guarding 
the essential requirements, there is no possibility that the collective is ever struck in its core. (Latour, 
2004: p. 214-217) 
A comparison between collectives may very well look like the comparisons we saw in the tables of 
translation that Latour presented in his first two Gifford Lectures (see paragraph 2.3). Instead of 
comparing abstracts notions of an external entity (Nature or Religion), the translation table allows 
Latour to compare the features of these entities. The similarities and differences become much 
clearer and easier to discuss. This may also apply to the habits and essences of collectives. By 
comparing and understanding these, a greater collective becomes a possibility and ‘finally, we are 
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 Diplomacy is an expression and argument of Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers, who has had a great 
influence on Latour’s work. 
38
 Latour uses “he” when he refers to diplomats in a general fashion, and “she” when he refers specifically to 
the ecologist diplomat. 
39
 Experimental metaphysics is ‘the search for what makes up the common world’, not a prematurely defined 
idea of truth or knowledge (Latour, 2004: p. 242). In other words, it is an open-minded philosophy that does 
not exclude any explanations in advance. 
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going to know what we want and what this “we” is that says it is endowed with a will’ (Latour, 2004: 
p. 217). So, will it be possible to compose the future we want? Answering this question now would be 
premature! First we have to reflect more. 
 
4.6. In conclusion  
It must be obvious by now that there is no way to replace my sister’s model globe with another one. 
Latour himself argues that there is no scale model for the collective, because no reduction of it is 
possible as it is too complex and too experimental. Only through the looping character of the 
compositionist process – with its learning curve – can this problem of scale be solved. (Latour, 2004: 
p. 199) What metaphor could we then give for the new world, the new Constitution? That of the 
hospital? That seems to be too static, although there is a lot of dynamism involved. Perhaps it is best 
to stick with Latour’s own metaphoric expression: composition! Who would have a problem with 
being part of a collective, artistic and experimental project? Those who believe in primary and 
secondary qualities, maybe? In any case, it is clear that the new collectives and their political 
processes come with many uncertainties. And this may be the best thing that could happen, since the 
old “world order” of modernity only provided a false sense of security, which seems to have been 
lost anyway.  
I never set out to evaluate the whole concept of compositionism. It would have taken more space 
and time than I have for this research. However, in the next session I will try to visualize a practical 
application for Latour’s political ecology. It will become clear that there are some problematic sides 
to compositionism. 
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5. Composing the future we want? 
 
5.1. From theory to potential practice 
Now that we have become familiar with the theory of Bruno Latour’s political ecology, it is possible 
to start exploring practical applications of compositionism. Indeed, it is desirable to imagine ways to 
put the theory into practice. In my hypothesis I stated that compositionism would be best practiced 
at an international level. We have now learned that the reality seems more complicated and 
nuanced. However, it is still useful to connect compositionism to an existing practice in order to 
explore limits and possibilities of the theory. Other scholars have attempted to use Latour’s work for 
the analysis of specific practices. For example, Jessica Dempsey (2009) has taken environmental 
politics in the Great Bear Rainforest in British Columbia, Canada as a practical case to test Latour’s 
political ecology. More specifically, she has put Latour’s assessment of the way environmentalists use 
Science to achieve their goals to the test. In a highly interesting article Deadly Dingoes: ‘Wild’ or 
Simply Requiring ‘Due Process’? (2007) Stephen Healy applies some of the aspects of Latour’s 
political ecology to a case study on the politics regarding dingoes that attacked humans on Fraser 
Island in Australia. One of his critical points will be discussed later.  
However, my goal is not to evaluate a test case in retrospect but to envision the conditions in which 
compositionism could transform an existing practice in the future. Or, differently put, to create a 
somewhat clearer picture of how it could be applied. As a case study I have chosen the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) for two, rather obvious, reasons. First of 
all, the UNCSD shares a goal with Latour’s political ecology, namely to find a way to keep the Earth a 
liveable planet. Second, in many ways the previous gatherings of the UNCSD resemble the ideas of 
compositionism. I will come back to these points in paragraph 5.2 in which I present two scenarios 
for applied compositionism in the context of the UNCSD. However, first I will go into some of the 
questions and difficulties concerning compositionism that need to be addressed in advance. These 
can be divided into two categories: difficulties that arise in the collective process (paragraph 5.1.1) 
and those that arise in the inter-collective process (5.1.2). Interestingly enough, Latour himself has 
taken up the difficult task of the collective in his project An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. This 
project will be introduced in paragraph 5.1.3. 
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5.1.1. Difficulties in the collective process 
There are a few difficulties I wish to address when it comes to applied compositionism. First of all, 
there is the main question of how to start. As we have seen, it is uncertain beforehand how many 
collectives there are and how they are defined or characterized. If we have to start collecting from 
nothing, who would start and on what grounds? As Latour admits, his proposal ‘is not simply 
European but French, perhaps even social democratic, or worse still, logocentric’ (2004: p. 221) and it 
would be nothing short of a miracle if it appealed to a majority of people. And the majority of which 
people are we even talking about? The former “moderns”, for example? Can we imagine Latour’s 
political ecology to be adopted by, for example, the European Parliament as well as European 
parliaments? Could President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz, a social democrat himself, 
be willing and able to convince the members of the various political groups like ALDE (liberal 
democrats), EPP (Christian democrats), S&D (social democrats) and the Greens that they should be 
joined by scientists, economists and moralists? Would these groups accept a smaller, yet in ways 
more influential, role in a process of redefining the “Great European Narrative”40? Could the member 
states be persuaded to rewrite – in compositionist terms – the Treaty of Lisbon41, which indeed was 
designed to make the EU more democratic and better able to face global challenges? Would it be 
possible for a new Treaty of Paris42 to start over the European project? How would the European 
universities respond? After all, many of them have been there for centuries, some even before the 
European nation states were established. In other words: how can the institutions of the Modernist 
Constitution be replaced? And if the Europeans were able to agree on a new start, where would they 
begin? After all, there is no “reset button” that can undo the premature unification, the power 
relations and the practices of the past centuries. Even though Latour feels we are close to the 16th 
century, there is no way to travel back in time to change the future. To compose the common world 
in the past is not compossible, to speak with David Lewis (1976). In his account on theoretical time 
travel, Lewis argues that even if we could travel in time, it would not possible to change the past in a 
significant way without creating a different history. Otherwise, we would not have ended up where 
we are now. In this sense, Latour is rather like Dickens’ Ghost of Christmas Past, which shows 
Scrooge the mistakes of his past, without him being able to change it. Similarly, the Europeans 
cannot change their past, so in what way can they use it in order to recompose the common world of 
the future?  
                                                          
40
 See Intermezzo. 
41
 See http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/take/index_en.htm. 
42
 The original Treaty of Paris (1952), which expired in 2002, was the first major step towards European 
integration. And since Paris is the city where Latour resides, it would be the perfect place to start “Europe” 
anew. 
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Another difficulty of the collective work is the focus of compositionism on the sciences. Although 
Latour has dethroned Science, he has at the same time maintained an important role for the 
sciences. This may be valid as the sciences have proven themselves to be extremely valuable in 
expanding our knowledge, but the problem is that the development of the sciences has been greatly 
influenced by politics. Again, it is impossible to escape the past. The origins of modern (here: 
modernist and contemporary) science can be found in Europe, and although it has spread 
throughout the world, the degree of scientific development certainly varies around the world. 
Therefore, the skills of the scientist and the economist that Latour wants to use in the collective 
process may not be equally developed in various collectives. The question then arises whether or not 
the collective process is appropriate for all possible collectives. Even though Matthew C. Watson 
(2011) seems to have misunderstood the nuances of Latour’s theory43, I share some of his concerns. 
Watson argues that postcolonial and feminist studies have demonstrated that Latour fails to 
recognize the impact of the socio-political contexts in which the sciences have developed, leading to 
a lack of representational quality within them. However, it is not Latour’s goal to emancipate the 
sciences, but to change the constitution under which the sciences should perform their tasks. As we 
have seen, composing the common world can be done badly. If the sciences are dominated by 
western men, it is possible that the composition has failed. The skills of moralists and politicians 
might prohibit that. However, in most parts of the world, politics and sources of morality are also 
largely dominated by men. Latour may argue that good compositions are never guaranteed in 
advance. But it is unmistakeably true that under-development of the various skills may render 
compositionism unsuitable for some, if not all, collectives.  
Moreover, some collectives may not even have the same interpretation of democracy or 
appreciation for the various skills. Surely, political, economic and scientific skills may be well-suited 
for a “European” collective, but is the same true for other collectives? I dare not give a definite 
answer to this question, but Stephen Healy’s article on the deadly dingoes suggests this is the case. 
He argues that there are “partial perspectives” or “situated knowledges”, two terms he borrows from 
Donna Haraway, that exist next to conventional knowledge. These (non-scientific) forms of 
knowledge should be part of the collective process as well: ‘Affirmative cosmopolitics thus requires 
democratically informed world-building practices analogous to those described by Latour, but 
sensitive to both conventional knowledge and ‘partial perspectives’ of all kinds. The practices of 
Australia’s Aborigines have long reflected such sensitivity.’ (Healy, 2007: p. 463) Among the practices 
of Aborigines, Healy continues, is the creative practice called Dreaming. However, it could be argued, 
that these “situated knowledges” could have a place in the collective process, for example in the 
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 Watson obviously misinterprets the meaning of externalization of propositions in the collective process. 
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consultations. Clearly, this political ecology has to be taken as a proposal and discussed in an 
international arena44, and possibly modified before it can be applied. It is even possible that each 
collective has to determine its own set of rules for the process. However, that will lead to some other 
problems, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
The last and perhaps most important difficulty is the question of power. It is obvious that the 
Compositionist Constitution takes away certainties and with that power relations change. The 
institutions of science, religion and politics will get a different role and their authority will be under 
scrutiny. Then there are, as Michael S. Northcott (2013) argued after Latour’s final Gifford Lecture, 
the interests of corporations and businesses that might not be commensurable with Latour’s political 
ecology. Their only matter of concern might be money. In short, to change any status quo is 
extremely difficult, and the implementation of compositionism is likely to suffer from that. 
 
5.1.2. Difficulties in inter-collective process 
A first difficulty of applying compositionism in the inter-collective process is that it is rather unclear 
how the inter-collective process works. Unlike the collective process, which is described in much 
more detail in Politics of Nature, the exercise of inter-collective diplomacy is scarcely addressed. 
Thus, it remains unclear whether the inter-collective process is similar to the collective process, or 
very different. However, as we have seen in paragraph 4.5, the work should be done by ecological 
diplomats whose main task is to make a distinction between the essential requirements and 
temporary expressions of her collective. This indicates that the diplomatic exercise is different from 
the process of taking into account and arranging in rank order. In that case, the skills of the collective 
process are no longer required. Yet, if that is true, it might become extremely difficult for the 
diplomat to judge the propositions of the other diplomats. An understanding of propositions may not 
necessarily be required to reach a compromise, but if the goal is to compose a common world, it 
seems there has to be a common understanding of the propositions. If the common world of the 
collectives is to be the basis for policy – after all, it was Latour’s goal to find ways of sustainable living 
– it would have to be understood by all the involved collectives. But if different collectives have 
different ways of (or reasons for) internalizing certain propositions, how could they convince each 
other of the validity of their propositions, let alone make the others understand? This would be no 
problem if every collective has the exact same procedures and standards. Each collective could then 
trust on the outcomes of the looping process of the other. But this is unlikely and to presume as 
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 Although the position of nation states and international organizations has been altered by Latour’s theory 
(and in the real world), we still live in pre-collective times, so we cannot speak of and inter-collective arena yet. 
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much would be a form of premature unification. However, Latour has made clear that the diplomatic 
exercise consists of more than just discovering what the collectives already agree on. The common 
ground is not limited to the propositions that the collectives might have in common. It has to be 
negotiated. As open-minded and experimental the diplomats may be, the chance of success seems so 
small45 that it begs the question whether the diplomatic exercise is worth an effort. 
A second difficulty that comes with inter-collective work is that the individual collectives have to exist 
in order to start. We have already seen that it is difficult to imagine the ways in which collectives may 
start to take shape. Even if we begin collecting today, it will take decades or more before collectives 
will have formed and before the inter-collective process can begin. The main goal of compositionism, 
composing the common world, is not hindered by that amount of time. However, it might not be the 
best pace for the underlying motivation of Latour’s political ecology: the establishment of a 
sustainable home on Earth. However, it is obviously possible that survival of mankind might not be 
the common concern of all collectives. To assume otherwise would be premature indeed. 
 
5.1.3. An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (AIME Project) 
Sometimes the best way of starting a complicated task is just to start experimenting somewhere. And 
this is precisely what Latour has done. Not content with just crafting his political ecology in theory, 
he has initiated a project to begin the collective work of the former moderns. An Inquiry into Modes 
of Existence is more than a book46, it is an online research project47 of which Latour is the “principal 
investigator”(AIME: The Team). Its goal is to identify and characterize the modes of existence of the 
(former) moderns.  The meaning of modes of existence is defined as followed: 
When one speaks normally about the mode of existence of some group or individual, one refers 
to their customs, their mode of being, their [ethnology], their habitat in some way, their feeling 
for a place. In this inquiry, we are keeping all the connotations of the phrase, but we are giving 
the two terms “mode” and “existence” stronger meanings that don’t direct attention towards 
human groups or individuals, but towards the beings about which humans are interrogating 
themselves. The word “being” should not be unsettling: it is another way of replying to the 
question, “What, for example, is the law, or religion, or science?” “What is important to you?” 
and “How can I talk about this properly with you?’ 
(AIME: Project) 
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 Latour admits as much (2004: p. 215). 
46
 For now, only available in French. 
47
 See http://www.modesofexistence.org/. From now I will refer to this site using (AIME). 
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The research project draws on the work that Latour has done in the last few decades. He has 
distinguished fifteen modes of existence that are presented in the book, which serves as an “interim 
report”, and will be modified on the website. The goal is to keep improving the definitions of these 
modes of existence, in order to define the anthropology of the moderns, in order to make the 
comparison with other collectives. Latour has invited readers and researchers to contribute to the 
different phases of the project through the website. This project started in 2012 and is still running.  
Unfortunately, the book has not been published at the time of my research and the website offers 
limited information on the exact processes of the project. The first two phases, respectively reading 
the book and commenting on it, are meant to form propositions. In phase three of the project, a 
series of meetings will be organized in which the proposals will be negotiated. It is yet unclear 
whether these meetings will be organized according to the procedures of the Compositionist 
Constitution. The description of these meetings, which are scheduled to start in the summer of 
201348, does seem to offer room for this: 
To launch such negotiations, the mediators will invite a certain number of commentators and co-
researchers to face-to-face meetings organised around the most thorny questions the inquiry has 
thrown up, those where the opposition between values and the accounts given of them is the 
most serious. The results of these meetings will then be archived in the digital environment of the 
AIME site, and will be subject to various responses. The aim, both ambitious and modest, will be 
to propose an alternative for the term “modernize”, one that is compatible with the expression 
“ecologize” and which we sum up with the term “composition”. Learning how to compose the 
common world, this is what is at stake. 
(AIME: Phase Three) 
It will be interesting to see what the outcomes of AIME will be, because even as it is done on a small 
scale, it might offer valuable insights for the application of compositionism on a bigger scale. In an 
ideal world, it might even form the actual basis of a future collective. In any case, it is of no use to 
solely focus on the difficulties of compositionism, without imagining and experimenting with the new 
possibilities it offers. 
 
5.2. UNCSD 
After discussing some general problems of applied compositionism and introducing the AIME project, 
I would now like to turn to a short case study of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
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 Although there appears to be some delay in the project. The English translation of the book was supposed to 
be published in March 2013, but it is rescheduled to appear in August 2013. 
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Development. It would be highly interesting to evaluate the previous events of the UNCSD according 
to Latourian theory, like Healy did with the deadly dingoes case or Jessica Dempsey in her article on 
British Columbia’s Great Bear Rainforest (2009). Unfortunately that exercise is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, it is possible to look forward and imagine what it would take in order to 
organize this conference in Rio de Janeiro in the year 2032 according to compositionist principles. 
After the first Rio summit in 1992 and the second, Rio+20 in 2012, what would Rio+40 look like if 
collectives convene? Before I start this experimental exercise, I will explain why the UNCSD is an 
interesting case study, but also in what ways it diverges from the compositionist project (paragraph 
5.2.1). To conclude this étude, I will present two scenarios in which compositionism forms the basis 
for a future conference. 
 
5.2.1. UNCSD and compositionism 
It was only weeks before the Rio+20 conference, when I first started to learn about compositionism. 
With the limited knowledge of Latour’s work I had at that time, it struck me that much of what he 
was saying was about happening at that very moment. All over the world, people had been preparing 
their definitions and visions to bring them in at the conference, to decide together “The future we 
want”49. Not only members states of the United Nations were attending the conference but also a 
number of so-called “major groups”, such as business and industry, children and youth, scientific and 
technological communities, farmers, indigenous peoples, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
women, unions and local authorities.50 In various countries a long process went into the preparation 
of Rio+20. In the Netherlands, for example, the Netherlands Platform Rio+20 organized the Dutch 
input through a series of meetings, and the use of a special website and social media. Among those 
consulted in the meetings were Dutch women, youth, corporations, NGOs and researchers51. 
(Brummel et al., 2012) 
However, after the various nations and groups had put together their vision statements and a series 
of preliminary meetings were held, the real conference took ten days, with seven days for 
preparatory side events and three days for the actual summit. In compositionist terms this is rather 
short of course. And even though the gathering of so many stakeholders from all around the world 
seems promising, it neither resembles the collective process, nor the inter-collective process as I 
have now understood it. From the Rio+20 website itinerary it becomes clear that most meetings have 
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 This slogan, in all its innocent naiveté, would be the first thing that Latour would put on the agenda to be 
decomposed. 
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 See: http://www.uncsd2012.org/majorgroups.html. 
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 Also see: http://www.nprio2012.nl/. 
78 
 
had a presentational character, not a representational. Moreover, in the final three days the 
negotiations were mostly up to the heads of states and other politicians. It does not take a thorough 
investigation to conclude that this was not the way Latour would have organized the conference. 
However, as we have seen, the goal of both Latour’s political ecology and the UNCSD is the same: to 
build a sustainable home on Earth. The result of Rio+20, however, has been generally described as 
disappointing (see for example: Van Haren, 29-07-2012; Human Rights Watch, 22-06-2012; Rodrigo, 
24-06-2012). Marcus Orellana of the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) claimed that 
four main reasons were responsible for the weak final agreement: 
First, the challenge to produce a vocabulary and a common vision of sustainability that integrates 
economic, social, and environmental policies that account for different cultures, religions, and 
ideologies cannot be underestimated. Second, States find it difficult to leave aside their individual 
interests and to embrace the challenges involved in facing the anth.ropocene. Third, the lack of 
trust between the North and South complicates the dialogue. [..] Finally, the weakness of the 
document can be attributed to the negotiations dynamics, given that the document only includes 
themes and language on which the Parties could reach consensus. Given the lack of ambition of 
States, the common denominator is very low.  
(Orellana, 22-06-2012)  
The first, second, and fourth problem that Orellana mentions here are indirectly addressed by 
Latour’s political ecology. The matter of trust between the North and South is perhaps more difficult 
to overcome. But by taking seriously the propositions of other collectives, it may become possible for 
the collective(s) of the North to regain some of the trust. In any case, I would like to argue that all the 
participants of Rio+20 should take an interest in compositionism as a new way to assemble, perhaps 
20 years later? What would it take to organize Rio+40 in a compositionist fashion? In the next 
paragraphs I will present my two scenarios and their advantages and disadvantages.  
 
5.2.2. Scenario 1: Complete Compositionism 
The first scenario I would like to propose is the full application of compositionism. In this scenario, 
the world adopts the Compositionist Constitution, and the application is not limited to merely the 
UNCSD. It means a radical change in the way the world is organized. Politics, sciences, economics and 
morality are no longer regarded as separate and independent domains, but the skills that are typical 
for these fields are put to a different use. There is no need to fully describe this situation all over 
again; it is indeed what has been described in the previous section. 
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To make this scenario work, the political ecology has to be proposed not just among scholars, but 
also in political, economic and other domains. The different forums and organisations of the United 
Nations seem to be the best way to promote it. But in order for it to be fully adopted, the 
Compositionist Constitution has to be carefully scrutinized and possibly recomposed in order to be 
embraced by the highest possible number of nations52. The AIME project might serve as a test case 
for the first phase of the collective. The successes and failures of this experimental venture that 
Latour has initiated, will play a decisive role. In addition, as I have argued before, some (potential) 
collectives may have a different appreciation for the skills that Latour proposes to use.  
The second step in this scenario is to start the work of the collectives. Again, AIME might prove to be 
valuable for a European or “modern” collective. Other projects may start this delicate task for other 
(potential) collectives. The number of collectives cannot be determined in advance but during the 
process of internalizing and externalizing propositions, the “contours” and numbers of collectives will 
become more apparent. It is likely that these collectives do not replace nations or even regions in the 
world. People from all over the world might associate themselves with a certain collective. Likewise, 
a collective will not be determined (exclusively) by religion or world view. As we have seen, the few 
hardliners who still hold on to their prematurely unified entities (for example Nature One and 
Religion One) have no business in the compositionist project. The new Constitution demands an 
open-minded and experimental attitude. The collectives each compose their common world of 
propositions and the external world of rejected propositions. On this basis they can, for example, 
participate in a successor of the UNCSD, which is the third step of the scenario. 
The third step is what I have called the second phase of compositionism. It is the inter-collective 
work. This resembles the process of Rio+20, but it is different all the same. First of all, the 
representatives do not represent a nation state or major group. Instead, ecological diplomats 
represent their respective collectives. It might be useful to reform the United Nations for this phase. 
The name alone is no longer applicable. First of all, there are no nations that come together, but 
collectives. Second, they are not yet united at all. This too is a premature unification. Instead, they 
are trying to unite their compositions. The name I propose is therefore the Uniting Collectives (UC). 
Thus, Rio+40 will be the unofficial name of the UCCSD. A conference like this takes place over a 
longer period of time and more often. As the collective work continues, the diplomatic process has to 
continue as well. As we have seen in the previous section, the outcome of this diplomatic exercise is 
always highly uncertain. But, as we know, the current UNCSD has the same flaw. But if the UC do 
succeed in composing a common world, they can truly try to come to agreements on the course of 
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 Bear in mind that the current UN is also not fully representative of all of the nations of world. 
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action they will take. After all, they need to do more than decide what can be part of the common 
world. As we have seen, sometimes modifications have to be made to propositions in order to create 
a new hierarchy. For example, if the level of CO2 emissions by air traffic (proposition A) is an 
included, but undesirable part of the common world, measures (proposition B) can to be proposed to 
reduce the level of emissions. If there are no technological innovations to achieve this goal, 
proposition B might lead to externalization of proposition A by another policy, for example a 
(temporary?) ban on air traffic. 
This is in short the first scenario53. There are a few advantages to this scenario. First of all, the 
procedures of compositionism form a highly meticulous process. It avoids the political pitfalls of 
short term interests and temporary fads and brings together the best of the world to address shared 
issues. Second, although the process seems more complicated at first, the change of success might 
become bigger as the collectives take seriously the task of being experimental and open-minded. 
Moreover, it might be argued that the number of collectives may be smaller than the number of 
nation states and major groups that were present at Rio+20. Even though we are not sure of the 
number of collectives that will emerge, it seems implausible that it will be higher than the current 
number of nation states. The AIME project, for example, is aimed at the collective work of the former 
moderns, and this group covers more than a few countries. Moreover, it is no longer necessary for 
special interest groups to be present at the UCCSD, as they are now part of the collective work. Non-
humans, for example, are already represented in the first phase of compositionism. 
The disadvantages of this scenario are in a large part related to the benefits of it. The scrupulous 
process, for example, is rather time consuming. This may not be appealing, especially to the often 
ambitious and eager proponents of sustainable development. In addition, the outcome of Rio+20 
was disappointing in part because of the superficial character of the language the parties could agree 
on. It is obviously extremely hard to find common ground on these matters. The ecological diplomats 
will likely have an equally difficult time exercising their task. However, none of these disadvantages 
are new. In fact, they already exist. Political progress is slow and difficult to achieve. If this scenario 
does not solve this issue, it also does not aggravate it54.  
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 Obviously, it requires a lot more elaboration but, again, the scope of this thesis is limited. 
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 Perhaps it is no coincidence that Latour and I share the same mantra: to proceed quickly, one has to slow 
down (see Latour, 2004: p. 7). 
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5.2.3. Scenario 2: Partial Compositionism 
It is obvious that the first scenario will be hard to achieve. Therefore, I propose a second scenario in 
which the Compositionist Constitution is only partially implemented. If the entire world is not 
interested in Latour’s political ecology, the people who are committed to sustainable development 
might benefit from some of its principles it in a different way. This application does not differ much 
from the way the UNCSD was arranged in 2012. Rio+40 itself could be organized as a collective. The 
process would be similar, although it will take longer. The processes of taking into account and 
ranking in order are executed in an international setting. The skills of politicians, scientists, moralists 
and economists can be applied to explore and discuss propositions concerning specific topics, such as 
the green economy or biodiversity. All the spokespersons are relevant experts and stakeholders on 
the topic. Negotiations take place on the basis of joint findings, instead of on the basis of countless 
vision pieces of all the involved nations and major groups. Such documents are counterproductive 
because they have their own concealed history and the character of premature unifications. Every 
part of a predetermined vision that is not achieved in the negotiations is experienced as a loss. 
Therefore, policies have to be based on the outcome of the collective process. The results are then 
presented to (inter)national governments, which have been involved in the process as stakeholders 
and have committed themselves to this type of decision making.  
The advantage of this kind of applied compositionism is that it is less dramatic than the kind of the 
first scenario. It resembles the current practice and might be more appealing. Committed parties can 
form such a collective more easily, because they already share the same concerns. Another beneficial 
aspect is that there are no individual (national) losses, because there are no preferred results in 
advance. The results are truly results of the process. In the first scenario, collectives do lose a little in 
the diplomatic negotiations, but no essential requirements. 
However, this scenario also has some disadvantages. The first is that it will be very hard to decide 
who are relevant spokespersons when it comes to planetary matters. Each nation, people or 
organization that is in some way a stakeholder will feel the need to be represented, which makes it 
more difficult to even start the negotiations. The advantage of the first scenarios is that planetary 
negotiations could be done by ecological diplomats, probably in smaller numbers. In addition, the 
outcomes of this collective process will influence the ones outside of the collective. It is just one 
small gathering of people who may compose a shared vision that is achieved separately from the 
outside world. It will have to compete against all the other political forces in the world. The 
advantage of the first scenario is that it already involves all the political forces in the various 
collectives. Any result that will be achieved will truly be collective. 
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6.  Analysis and conclusion 
 
6.1. Analysis  
Slowly but surely we have come to the concluding pages of my little composition. It is time to come 
to a provisional closure. What can I say about my hypothesis? Indeed, compositionism seems to be 
an international affair. Or better yet: it is a collective affair. The borders drawn by nations are not 
only irrelevant when it comes to planetary concerns, but collectives also would not be limited – or 
expanded – by them. However, I was wrong to assume that compositionism could best be practiced 
in an international political arena like the UNCSD. Despite the similarities in goals, the focus of such a 
conference is much too limited for the Latour’s political ecology. The scope of compositionism is 
broader, at least when you adopt the first scenario that I presented. On the other hand, if this 
scenario fails, due to some of the reasons that we have seen in the Étude (historical ties, power 
relations and deeply rooted diversity in politics and knowledge production), the second scenario 
becomes more likely. In that sense, the UNCSD is indeed one of the most logical arenas to apply 
compositionist principles and processes.  
And what about the question posed in the subtitle of this thesis? Will it be possible to compose the 
future we want? For this we have to analyze the different aspects of this slogan. First of all, the 
outcome may not necessarily be that everyone wants sustainable development. In the first scenario, 
it is entirely possible that the collective and inter-collective processes do not necessarily lead to 
sustainable development. We cannot predict or assume in advance that this is the result of the 
composition of the common world. Humans may finally take non-humans into account, but the 
established hierarchies may not automatically turn out in their favour. However, the result of the 
work of composition is indeed what “we” want. In the second scenario, this “we” will be much more 
limited as the collective work is done by a relatively small group. But they are likely to be committed 
to a sustainable development. Secondly, as we have seen, Latour proposes the term prospect instead 
of future, as prospects give us the chance to progress with our noses pointing forward instead of 
backward. Thirdly, the compositionist project does not only entail the things that are “wanted”, but 
also things that “are”. The distinction between “is” and “ought to be” (or facts and values) is no 
longer valid, as we have seen. The question of the good common world is singular in compositionism. 
Thus, for the first scenario I propose the slogan: The prospect we compose. And for the second: The 
prospect some of us compose. 
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6.2. Conclusion 
Compositionism, it is an appealing word for an intriguing political theory. However, it does not come 
without some challenges. As we have seen, Latour’s concepts are difficult to grasp. It is one thing to 
recognize the problems of modernity as he describes them, it is a wholly different thing to picture his 
solutions in practice. Let me attempt a brief recapitulation of the preceding discussion. In the era of 
modernity, nature and society have been divided into two separate worlds. The former was 
supposed to be the same for all, but could only be known through Science. The latter, in contrast, 
consisted of many expressions of values and views, and was the realm of human diversity and 
politics. Whereas the debates of Science were mostly hidden in the background, those of culture, 
religion and politics were out in the open. However, this divided globe of modernity is shattered by 
Latour and the only way to speak of a common world again is to compose it collectively. In this slow 
and continuous process, politicians work with scientists, economists, moralists and administrators to 
answer the question of what is the good common world. The first stages of the process consist of 
deciding what humans and non-humans are taken into account and in the second stages it has to be 
determined how all humans and non-humans are ranked in order. Every result of the collective 
process is provisional and progress is only achieved through a looping motion. Once a collective has 
taken its temporary but distinctive shape it becomes possible to start diplomatic negotiations with 
other collectives. Ultimately the inter-collective work should lead to a better understanding of what 
it means and takes to live on planet Earth.  
However, it has become clear that applied compositionism is a tricky business. Like any extensive 
political project, the application of the new world order of a Compositionist Manifesto requires a lot 
of imagination, perhaps more than I have been able to display here. But in addition to an inventive 
mind, it is also necessary to have a realist mind in order to face the very real and practical obstacles 
that you will face along the way. Historical patterns, power relations and deeply rooted diversity 
make any worldwide political project extremely difficult. However, this much is already true in 
current international relations. Compositionism does not necessarily take these problems away. Yet, 
there are possibilities to implement this political ecology, either worldwide or partially at the next 
UNCSD. Both scenarios for Rio+40 that I have sketched are extremely brief and come with a set of 
challenges. In any case, Latour’s proposition needs to be scrutinized more carefully as it is deeply 
Western and not fully developed. Much more research and experimentation has to be done, before 
the Compositionist Constitution can actually become a successful approach to worldwide matters. 
There are a few suggestions for further research I would like to make at the end of this thesis. First of 
all, it would be relevant to explore the question of potential collectives more in depth. For example, 
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in what way can (non-modern) societies form collectives? Do the same rules and skills apply or are 
there different propositions and practices? This is not automatically a matter of consulting 
anthropologists, who – as we have seen – have been known to make use of the Modern Constitution 
in their approach. The second suggestion I would like to put forward is to study the scenarios that I 
have drafted in depth. Obviously, there are many questions and loose ends that deserve a more 
thorough consideration.  
I hope to have recomposed the formulation of Latour’s agenda in such a way that makes it more 
accessible to a wider range of people. By directly connecting compositionism to an international 
forum (UNCSD) that is known all over the globe I expect it to generate more interest as well as 
creative views on how to apply it. I am hesitant to say that compositionism is the way to go, but it 
does deserve serious worldwide consideration. And as political, ecological, and economic crises are 
persistent everywhere it could be the right time for Latour to indeed publish his revolutionary 
“Compositionist Manifesto”. It may just offer the Earth the prospect it wants! 
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Abstract 
 
In this thesis the applicability of Bruno Latour’s political ecology (or: compositionism) is examined by 
connecting the theory to the practice of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD). Both in goal and in design, this theory and practice share similarities but also differences. 
The main part of this thesis consists of a recomposition of the relevant writings and lectures of 
Latour, in order to make his complex oeuvre accessible to a broader audience. After a first 
introduction, this thesis goes deeper into Latour’s evaluation of modernity and the false divide 
between science and politics. Subsequently, his plea for ecologizing instead of modernizing is 
discussed as well as his composition theory. Next, the difficulties and possibilities of applying Latour’s 
theory in practice are briefly explored to finally come to an answer to the question: under which 
circumstances can we compose the future we want? 
